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SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND NONSTATE ACTORS IN  
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: A CASE STUDY

A theses presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

PHILLIP G. PATTEE, LCDR, USN  
B.S.M.E., University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, 1983

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
1996

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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND NONSTATE ACTORS IN OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: A CASE STUDY by LCDR Phillip G. Pattee, USN, 112 pages.

This study investigates the role of Special Operations Forces in the other than war environment of Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. It is specifically concerned with the potential of nonstate actors to either assist or hinder Special Operations Forces in the attainment of national and military objectives.

In view of the fact that Haiti is only one case study, this thesis concentrates on current U.S. Army and Joint doctrine for operations other than war using Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY as a measure of their effectiveness.

The thesis concludes that current doctrine is generally effective and useful for planning and conducting future operations. The study noted that current doctrine promotes the idea that association with some nonstate actors would have the effect of inadvertently legitimizing them. This study suggests that association with the Haitian Armed Forces and the nonstate actor, Front for Advancement and Progress of Haiti actually degraded legitimacy of U.S. forces, while the legitimacy of the nonstate actor and the Haitian Armed Forces was not enhanced. The study suggests that working with nongovernment organizations on a basis of convenience, rather than a contractual basis, hindered SOF ability to achieve unity of effort and the social and economic end state.

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My wife, Sally, suffered patiently through many long hours of work. Because of her support, kindness and encouragement I have been extremely blessed, and am eternally grateful.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### NONTRADITIONAL THREATS IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

This thesis examines the effect of nontraditional threats and nontraditional players on Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. This thesis will answer the question: What lessons from the impact of nonstate actors (NSAs) on SOF operations during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY can be applied to future Operations Other Than War (OOTW)?

#### Background

The U.S. Military may have reached a peak in its performance in Operation DESERT STORM. It showed that no nation on Earth could equal the combat power of the United States in traditional warfare. However, militaries often are not used for traditional warfare. They are used for many other roles such as peace operations, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense. Recently, the militaries of the world have been called upon by the United Nations more and more often to conduct nontraditional operations.

The power vacuum left by the former Soviet Union has increased this need in Eastern Europe,<sup>1</sup> but there are areas around the world where this need is just as compelling: Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia, and Haiti. In several areas the United States military has been called upon to provide assistance and find solutions in a wide variety of OOTW. In these

instances violence and force are minimized while security, order, and persuasion are maximized.<sup>2</sup> It is in this arena where the victor is the one with patience and an effective strategy.

The complexity of the problems presented has grown with the emergence of many nontraditional threats and influences. These nontraditional threats and influences include paramilitary groups, private security groups, criminal organizations, insurgents, nongovernment organizations, and private volunteer organizations. The existence of these groups is not new, nor is the United States involvement with them in OOTW. The events in the Philippines between February 1899 and July 1902 known as the Philippine Insurrection are a good example of the U.S. Army in action against rebels, bandits, and guerrillas. This pacification campaign is often thought of as an offshoot of the Spanish-American war, but it lasted longer and inflicted more casualties on United States soldiers. Almost every combat unit in the Army saw action in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902; nearly all of the officers in the Army gained experience in the pacification campaign, but very little was written about it.

One work, written by Captain John R. M. Taylor in 1906, was not published until 1971. Its publication was prevented earlier two different times by William Taft, first as Secretary of War, and second as President-elect because of its potential political consequences and effect on upcoming elections.<sup>3</sup> Action by the army in the Philippines for a pacification campaign (now included in the term OOTW) was expected to have a dramatic effect on the outcome of elections. Was this because the tactics employed would be perceived as unacceptable to the American

public and possibly an outright illegitimate use of the Army? Or is it because a handful of mere bandits were able to inflict such significant casualties on the Army that the administration would be embarrassed and the Army considered incompetent? Other perceptions are also possible, but it is clear that both the United States Government and the Army were uneasy with the Philippines' Insurrection and its lessons. These perceptions are one possible explanation for the lack of large amounts of written material on past OOTW operations. The need to enforce order is made no less compelling because of a lack of understanding.

As a growing body of information becomes available around the world, more is becoming understood about nontraditional threats and their capabilities. Their effects have grown such that they can be instruments for influencing national power. This makes them a viable concern. These nontraditional threats and influences can be viewed as being perpetrated by nonstate actors (NSAs), that is actors which have no formal ties to the government. Nor are they necessarily under any restraint, moral or physical, to comply with the laws and regulations of the state or international accord. As the influence, weaponry, tactics, and size of NSAs increases, the ability of the local governments to control them is often surpassed.

All of this taken into account, the United States' Military is increasingly likely to become involved in OOTW. In most, perhaps all, cases NSAs will affect the attainment of United States/United Nations goals in OOTW. The NSAs may oppose U.S. objectives or they may complement them. As such, the effects that NSAs have in OOTW and how

the military and NSAs interact demand increased study as a part of the military profession.

OOTW can involve many combat forces, and indeed they do, even though the focus is not on combat.<sup>4</sup> Combat training provides many of the skills required for soldiers engaged in OOTW. This is asserted as a lesson learned from Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti.

Training units for war produced units fully capable of conducting Operations Other Than War. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY demonstrated that units that conducted hard, realistic training for war produce the disciplined soldiers who will have the versatility to conduct OOTW. Throughout the initial phase of the operation, units applied tactics, techniques, and procedures that had been validated during rotations to the Joint Readiness Training Center and during the conduct of Battle Command Training Program Warfighter Exercises. Tasks and standards remain the same, only conditions change. The quality of the soldiers who comprise the force allowed for rapid transition from preparations for combat to the conduct of operations in an uncertain environment.<sup>5</sup>

This sweeping statement implies that soldiers require no training on OOTW; their regular combat training is adequate for the task. However, conduct of OOTW can be very complex and go beyond routine tasks so professional military officers must understand how and when to use their combat training and when specialized training may be better suited for their tasks.

Additionally, the threat of overwhelming force can add stability to a volatile situation. This is also validated by experience in Haiti.

The presence of overwhelming combat power intimidated potential hostile forces into avoiding confrontation. There were many instances where the potential for violence against U.S. troops was avoided. Even though operations were conducted in an uncertain environment, units ensured that plans were arranged so an operation could rapidly go hot. The presence of highly disciplined troops supported by light tanks, attack helicopters, and C-130 gunships was enough to dissuade anti-American elements from confrontation. A key ingredient to this mixture was clearly showing this force to these elements and leaders demonstrating resolve and patience. Many times situations were waited out and resolved without violence.<sup>6</sup>

Overwhelming combat presence may be effective in achieving stability in the short term, but the commitment of resources at this level is one the government may hope to make only for a limited time.<sup>7</sup> If the region affected is to remain stable, it will take a different level of involvement by the military to ensure that potential hostile and destabilizing forces continue to lose that potential even after the overwhelming presence is removed. This is a SOF role.

### Outline

This chapter provides the background and basis for the research and the theoretical construct of the research method. The second chapter examines the military's current understanding of NSAs in published doctrine and provides a basis for understanding how the military approaches NSAs in low intensity conflict or OOTW. Chapter three is a narrative of the interactions of NSAs and United States SOF drawn from Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The fourth chapter draws on existing doctrine and theories and compares this with the U.S. Military's recent experience in Haiti. Finally, the fifth chapter draws conclusions regarding where the U.S. Military's experience in Haiti validates and supports the use of current doctrine and where it does not. The chapter also recommends changes to doctrine based on this experience and suggests where further research might be done to provide more illumination on the topic.

### Research Question

The ongoing operations in Haiti are one OOTW arena where in particular United States SOF frequently must contend with NSAs in

conducting their daily operations. This thesis explores the impact NSAs in Haiti have on the employment of SOF in the conduct of SOF missions. A case study of the impact of these NSAs operations during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY can be instructive, and its lessons could profitably be employed in future operations conducted by SOF in OOTW. Specifically, this thesis will answer the question: What lessons from the impact of NSAs on SOF operations-during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY can be applied to future OOTW?

Subordinate questions that require answering before the primary question is answered are: Which NSAs had any effect on the missions the SOF conducted? What actions that were taken by SOF caused a reaction from the NSA? Using current doctrine as a basis, what were the expected results? An examination of the methods and strategies employed by the NSA to determine if their impact on SOF missions was incidental or part of a plan is required. The current methods employed, or doctrine, of the SOF as well as the intelligence information they had concerning NSAs, including threatening, complimentary, and neutral, provided a starting point for analysis of the adequacy of current SOF capabilities and strategies with regard to NSA. Finally, this must all be applied within the framework of the United States/United Nations interests in Haiti and the objectives to be accomplished by Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

#### Definitions

Several of the key terms used in this thesis are, nonstate actor (NSA), Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Operations Other Than War (OOTW).

Nonstate actors as used in this text include; paramilitary forces, nongovernment organizations/private volunteer organizations, organized crime groups, insurgents, and private security groups. Paramilitary forces are groups that are distinct from the regular military armed forces of any country but resemble them in organization, equipment, training or mission.<sup>8</sup> A nongovernment organization (NGO) or private volunteer organization (PVO) is a professional association, foundation, multinational business or other group with a interest in providing humanitarian assistance<sup>9</sup> to improve the quality of life of people.<sup>10</sup> NGO is a term normally used by organizations from outside the U.S., while the term PVO is prevalent with U.S. organizations. The two terms, NGO and PVO, are generally considered equivalent. Any organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict is an insurgency.<sup>11</sup>

Special Operations Forces are military units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, which are designated for special operations, and are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct those operations.<sup>12</sup> In the Army, SOF is Rangers, Special Forces, Special Operations Aviation, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units. SEAL teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) teams, and Special Boat Units (SBU) are SOF in the Navy. Air Force Special Operations units are fixed-wing and vertical-lift aircraft and aircrews designed to conduct infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply; aerial fire support; and aerial refueling. The Air Force also has composite special tactics teams for combat control, pararescue, weather, communications, and combat support.<sup>13</sup>

Special Operations are conducted by military forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means. These operations are conducted during peacetime, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional military forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low-visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. The degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets differentiate special operations from conventional operations.<sup>14</sup>

Operations Other Than War (OOTW) are military actions, except those associated with sustained, large-scale combat operations. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before and after war.<sup>15</sup> OOTW is a very inclusive and nebulous term that encompasses arms control, combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, nation assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, civil support operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, peace operations, support to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and even shows of force, attacks, and raids,<sup>16</sup> among other possible actions.

Several of the terms used to define OOTW are themselves blanket terms that need further clarification for use in this thesis. These are peace operations, and nation assistance.

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, defines peace operations as operations that encompass three types of activities, which

have a primarily diplomatic lead, these are preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building, and two complimentary and predominantly military activities, which are peacekeeping and peace enforcing. The military activities of peacekeeping and peace enforcing need to be further defined. A military or paramilitary operation undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement, is peacekeeping. Peace enforcement is the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally with international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.<sup>17</sup>

These definitions of peace operations are rather weak and not uniformly recognized by the international community. For instance, the United Nations does not use the term peace enforcement, but instead has the term peacemaking. The Secretary General of the U.N. Boutros Boutros-Ghali defines this as action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means, such as those foreseen in the United Nations Charter, Chapter VI.<sup>18</sup> This term is also used in Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, which defines it as a type of peace time contingency operation intended to establish or restore peace and order through the use of force.<sup>19</sup> Also, the idea that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are predominantly military can imply that the military operation is no longer subordinate to the political goal. It must be reinforced that the military objectives are always subordinate to the political in OOTW.

Peacekeeping and peace enforcing operations have a diplomatic lead but rely on heavy use of armed forces. This last statement is how the term peace enforcement is used in this thesis.

Nation assistance is cooperation by diplomatic, economic, informational, and military means between the U.S. and the government of another nation, with the objective of promoting internal development and the growth of sustainable institutions within that nation. It corrects the conditions that cause human suffering and improves the quality of life of the nation's people.<sup>20</sup>

### Limitations and Delimitations

Clearly there can be a vast array of NSAs that have affected SOF operations; this thesis will only examine those that had direct impact on Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Additionally, there may be instances of SOF and NSA interactions in Haiti earlier than the President of the United States' decision to use all necessary means to expel the illegal government of Haiti. This case study will investigate those that occurred from October 11, 1993, the date the USS Harlan County aborted docking in Port-au-Prince. Also, this thesis will not consider questions of whether intervention in Haiti was warranted, timely, or appropriate. The intervention has occurred and the thesis will not presume to question this, but rather will use this as a starting point for the case study.

The fact that it has only been a recent transition from the United States led multinational Force to the United Nations Mission in Haiti, and that some operations with U.S. SOF were still ongoing as the research took place, imposed some limitations on this research. The

problem this imposed was that while an operation was ongoing, a particular chain of events that was being studied had not yet come to a logical conclusion. These events still yielded useful insights but it must be recognized that conclusions drawn from them may be weaker since they predict a lesson from an expected but not yet observed end state.

### Literature Review

There is substantial literature from many media available on Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Some are specific about military operations while others dwell in the realm of politics. One major source of this information is the Army Knowledge Network. Its data base of information on Haiti is growing daily and greatly facilitated completion of this research.

There are several military doctrinal documents that discuss employment principles of Special Operating Forces in general terms including: authority for the organization, command and control relationships, and types of missions that could employ special forces. These include U.S. Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, JP 3-05, Washington, D.C. (1992); Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures, JP 3-05.3, Washington, D.C. (1993); Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, JP 3-53, Washington, D.C. (1993); Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, JP 3-57, (Test Pub), Washington, D.C. (1991); and U. S. Department of the Army, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, FM 100-25, Washington, D.C. (1991). Other publications from the U.S. Department of the Army are Psychological Operations, FM 33-1, Washington, D.C. (1993); Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, FM 33-1-1, Washington, D.C. (1994); Doctrine

for Special Forces Operations, FM 31-20, Washington, D.C. (1990); and Civil Affairs Operations, FM 41-10, Washington, D.C. (1993). These contain pertinent information about the strategies and operation of these Special Operation Forces and are necessary to complete this research.

Other army publications that discuss doctrine pertinent to completing this research are U.S. Department of the Army, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, FM 100-20, Washington, D.C. (1990); Peace Operations, FM 100-23, Washington, D.C. (1994); and Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations from the Joint Electronic Library, Fort Monroe, Virginia (1995). These documents provide necessary information about how the Army and Joint Forces view and conduct operations in OOTW.

Another work, Handbook for the Soldier in Operations Other Than War (OOTW), Special Edition No. 94-4 (July 1994), published by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Center for Army Lessons Learned, provides information that assists the soldier at the tactical level in operations other than war. This manual contains lessons learned about checkpoints, rules of engagement, soldier discipline, vehicular survival, installation security, personal awareness, language capabilities and use of interpreters, sniper threats, information gathering, Intelligence preparation of the battlefield, use of priority intelligence requirements checklists, psychological operations, negotiation and mediation, and peace enforcement patrols. The manual also gives general guidance on how to perform several tasks in which Special Forces might participate. There are several other publications from the U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, that are specific lessons and impressions from Haiti. They are Operation Uphold Democracy. Initial Impressions, Volume I (December 1994), Volume II (April 1995), and Volume III (July 1995). These books have specific lessons learned in the application of all aspects of the operation. They do not address the overall concept of operation or how each mission was expected to contribute to the overall success of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY but they are the most useful documents that were reviewed. The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Center for Army Lessons Learned, has also published HAITI. Operations Other Than War, Newsletter No. 94-3 (July 1994). This is a primer on the situation in Haiti as it existed in July 1994.

Most of the literature available in the electronic media of the World Wide Web on Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is focused on U.S. policy toward Haiti, past intervention in Haiti 1915-1934, and United Nations actions taken toward Haiti. The major emphasis of these works is either to document the political steps taken or to protest them. These have little utility in the thesis research. There are a few documents that can make worthwhile contributions to the research. These are the speeches by the President of the United States Bill Clinton, since they outline U.S. policy in Haiti. The other is the Constitution of Haiti, ratified in 1987. This is pertinent since its implementation is the overall goal of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

Periodicals are rich in articles on the United States intervention in Haiti. The value of these articles to this research varies considerably. One such article "The Haiti Contingency" from the

January 1994 issue of Military Review has useful insights of the United States' interests in Haiti, as well as good background information on Haiti's political and economic plight. It also makes the suggestion that the U.S. Task Forces in Haiti should emphasize service support, primarily engineering and medical capabilities. An article in Special Warfare, April 1994, "The Organized Crime Dimension of Regional Conflict and 'Operations Other than War'" although not specifically about Haiti does provide background on the magnitude of the problem imposed by non-traditional threats. Military Review has other articles that are not about Haiti but are useful to this thesis because they provide insights into problems and issues from OOTW that had previously been conducted by U.S. military forces. These are from the September 1993 Military Review "Operation Restore Hope: A USCENTCOM Perspective," "Operations Other Than War: Leading Soldiers in Operation Restore Hope," and "Food Distribution for Operation Provide Comfort," and in the October 1993 issue, "Civil Affairs Support in Operations Other Than War," and "Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations."

The publication Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement has a two part article written by Louis P. Kernisan, a Military Attaché in Haiti from 1989-1991. The first part, entitled "Haiti, Liberation Theology and Jean-Bertrand Aristide" appears in the winter 1992 volume, and the second, "Liberation Theology comes to Power: Haiti and Jean-Bertrand Aristide (2)," appears in the summer 1993 volume. This long article was of some use in this research since they provide recent political background on the circumstances in Haiti. This is useful

since this is necessary to understand the goals of some of the threats and supporters to U. S. interests in Haiti.

The summer 1994 issue of Foreign Policy has an excellent article "Haiti Mangled Multilateralism." This article was written by Ian Martin, who was the director of the OAS/U.N. International Civilian Mission in Haiti from April to December 1993, and a previous secretary general of Amnesty International. This article discussed the background for U.S. policy toward Haiti, and gave background on the formation of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) and their involvement in the events surrounding the refusal to dock the USS Harlan County on October 11, 1993. This provided necessary information concerning the objectives of FRAPH. Some good information on FRAPH's announcement that they would renounce violence and support the return of President Aristide, as well as the flight of Haiti's police chief, Lieutenant Colonel Francois, to the Dominican Republic are in the October 17, 1994, issue of MacLeans article "Sweet Mickey's Flight." This same article contains information about the arrest of some leaders of the organized crime group Black Ninjas. In general, this is a good article showing the reactions of some groups in Haiti to the United States military presence. This is part of the information required to answer the research question.

The Nation has several articles that discuss aspects of U.S. military occupation of Haiti, "The Eagle is Landing," October 3, 1994, and the relationship between FRAPH and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "He's Our SOB," October 31, 1994, "Constant's U. S. Visit: Sanctuary for FRAPH's Chief?" March 6, 1995, and "Haiti Under the Gun:

How U.S.-Backed Paramilitaries Rule," January 8/15, 1996. These articles do not specifically address the subject of this thesis but are of good value because of the information on FRAPH.

The U.S. News and World Report October 3, 1994, issue contains an article "Dealing With a Bad Hand," that discusses the prospects of U.S. troops on the ground in Haiti, and the March 13, 1995, issue's article, "Follow the Leaders," discusses the change from the U.S. led multinational force to the UNMIH. Both articles are general in their coverage of the topic. Neither article is useful for this study.

The military publications are useful to provide the basis for Special Forces employment, missions, and command and control. It is necessary to understand how Special Forces expect to operate so that useful comparisons can be made to the operations found in Haiti.

The research for this thesis will go further by identifying which of the tasks that the Special Forces conducted were fruitful, and which were not. The research will be conducted in the realm where the Special Operations Forces interacted with NSAs. This can be applied to form better strategies and courses of action in future operations.

The most useful sources of data to conduct this research is the letters, memoranda, messages, and briefing slides contained in the Warrior Information Network archives. One example is a letter from Mr. Jim Kelly of the Christian Relief Service (CRS) detailing the problems they have with looting of convoys intended to provide foodstuffs and relief supplies to Jacmel. In this March 15, 1995 letter he asks Captain Kirby of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) to provide military special forces escorts to the convoys. Another

example is the fragmentary order (FRAGO) 840, which directs Task Force (TF) Bronco to get direction from TF Raleigh and reconnoiter the fertile Artibonite valley region. These TF are made up of special forces and regular forces. Their mission is to assess the status of irrigation canals and provide input for further action on the part of NGO/PVO, USAID and the Government of Haiti (GOH).

A January 12, 1995, memorandum from the Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF) operations officer (S3) to the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) details the events surrounding the shutdown of the port facilities at Miragoane by the Organization of Popular Lavalas.

There is a tremendous amount of specific, detailed, and pertinent information contained in these archives that has facilitated the completion of this research.

Another significant source of information is the Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Latin America published by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It contains a large amount of data in the form of transcripts of radio broadcasts that contain information which was essential to completion of this research.

#### Research Design

The general research design of this thesis is the case study. To accomplish the study, two hypotheses are constructed. The first is that distinguishing the actions of SOF and their effects on the activities of NSA from other factors that affect the NSA decision process cannot be done. A second is that there is no knowledge that can

be applied in doctrinal principles or operations against a diverse group of NSAs in future OOTW.

To test these hypotheses the thesis first examines the doctrine used by SOF in OOTW. Next the research process gathers data on the specific actions taken by SOF to accomplish their objectives, and specific actions taken by NSAs in response. The events in Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY are used to develop the interaction between NSAs and SOF. The third part of the research process compared the data on interactions with the doctrine for OOTW as a template for the expected results. Finally, conclusions were drawn from that analysis.

#### Part One

This portion of the research will develop expectations of SOF operations and their success based on current doctrine and other scholarly works. This doctrine primarily comes from Joint Pub (JP) 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations; Field Manual (FM) 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations; FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict; FM 33-1, Psychological Operations; and FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, and their joint publication equivalents. It should answer the following broad questions: What doctrine does SOF use to conduct various forms of OOTW? How are NSAs considered in that doctrine?

#### Part Two

The method will consist of constructing the chain of events from the view point of one NSA until a logical end to the event is reached. This may be that the NSA attained its goals, or that it gave

them up. Paramount to the research in this step is to determine what the NSA reacted to. The same chain of events will then be examined from the SOF view point. This process will lay the ground work for determining whether the first hypothesis is true or false. Questions addressed are: For an action a NSA took with an intended purpose, did the SOF take its own action? Conversely for an action the SOF took with an intended outcome, did the NSA take some action or take no action? By this method no judgments are made about whether a NSA was supportive or belligerent toward Multinational Force efforts to restore the constitutionally elected government, or that their actions were specifically the result of SOF actions. Further this will not exclude any unintentional effects from becoming part of the data.

### Part Three

If once the studies of individual NSAs and their interactions with SOF are complete there are any events that are common to several interactions then this can be used to refute the second of the two hypotheses. This knowledge then becomes a lesson learned.

### Part Four

Making this knowledge useful in future OOTW scenarios will require a comparison of the lesson with current SOF doctrine. If it validates current doctrine, then there is evidence that the doctrine is effective and continues to be useful in similar OOTW situations. If it contradicts current doctrine, then it suggests recommendations to limit the use of doctrine in a similar circumstance or to change the doctrine

if it is shown to be ineffective. If the lesson falls outside of current doctrine, this can be used to recommend possible new doctrine for future application in OOTW.

In the following chapters the thesis develops the research model discussed. Chapter two will answer the questions: What is SOF doctrine as it applies to OOTW? What is the doctrine for NSA? The answers to these two questions is the template for expected SOF actions in OOTW with respect to NSA. The thesis will separately discuss the doctrine of each SOF group, primarily Special Forces, Psychological Operations Units, Civil Affairs Units and provide a synopsis of the overarching doctrine as a Joint Task Force Commander might apply it.

Chapter three will contain the data for the research, consisting of narratives of the actions taken by SOF and, separately, actions taken by NSA that were participants in the events in Haiti.

The analysis of the data will be the fourth chapter. This is where the comparison of the actions taken by SOF, the reactions of NSA, and the counteractions taken by SOF compared with the doctrinal template developed in the second chapter will show where doctrine was used and when it produced the desired result and when it did not. It will also show where doctrine was not used, either by design or by error, and whether the desired results were obtained.

Finally in the Fifth chapter this thesis will draw conclusions from the analysis completed in chapter four. The analysis conducted will show that the data either support or refute the two hypotheses constructed. The chapter will then suggest lessons learned that may be

applied in OOTW and make recommendations as to the soundness of current doctrine and proposed changes.

#### Conclusion

The doctrine used by SOF and by the military in OOTW is a useful starting point for determining the best method of interacting with NSAs. This study will not provide definitive answers about the best way to avoid problems with NSAs in future OOTW, but it should give planners additional experience to draw from when planning for the next OOTW environment.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1991), 1-2.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid. 2-11.

<sup>3</sup>John M. Gates, The Pacification of the Phillipines, 1898-1902. The American Military and the Far East: Proceeding of the Ninth Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, (Washington D.C. 1980): 79-91.

<sup>4</sup>U.S. Joint Chiefs, JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washington D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), I-9.

<sup>5</sup>U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Initial Impressions (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1994), iii.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid. iv.

<sup>7</sup>FM 100-25, 2-7.

<sup>8</sup>U.S. Joint Chiefs, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), 284.

<sup>9</sup>U.S. Joint Chiefs, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations (Washington D. C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), GL-7.

<sup>10</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-23, PEACE OPERATIONS (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994), 109.

<sup>11</sup>JP 1-02, 188.

<sup>12</sup>JP 1-02, 353.

<sup>13</sup>JP 3-05, II-1.

<sup>14</sup>JP 1-02, 353.

<sup>15</sup>JTF Commander's Handbook, GL-7.

<sup>16</sup>FM 100-5, 13-4 to 13-8.

<sup>17</sup>FM 100-23, 111-112.

<sup>18</sup>Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992), 11.

<sup>19</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990), glossary-6.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid. 109.

## CHAPTER TWO

### REVIEW OF SOF DOCTRINE IN OOTW

The United States intervened in Haiti under authorization from the United Nations Charter, Chapter VII to maintain peace and security. Although Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY does not fit neatly into what would be defined as a peace enforcement operation, this is a starting point for examining current U.S. doctrine as it applies to SOF and NSAs in OOTW, and how that was tailored for operation in Haiti. This review of doctrine will begin with the general as it applies to this conflict and then address more specific details of SOF and NSAs in conflict. This is necessary so that actions taken can be understood for how they fit into the objectives of the operation and the basic principles of how U.S. forces operate. Doctrine does not provide a procedure for actions in specific circumstances. Rather doctrine is "fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."<sup>1</sup> The following paragraphs build an approach to conducting operations.

#### Doctrine for OOTW

Successful operations by any force in an OOTW environment generally adhere to the principles from Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), FM 100-20, known as the LIC imperatives. These are political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability,

legitimacy, and perseverance.<sup>2</sup> The U.S. Army considers these imperatives applicable in all forms of OOTW including peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations.<sup>3</sup> Despite this, the U.S. Army has additional doctrine discussed under the terms operations other than war in Operations, FM 100-5, and peace operations in Peace Operations, FM 100-23. These last two publications contain the imperatives, unity of effort, perseverance, and legitimacy, but rename them as principles. They also introduce the principles of security, restraint, and objective, but omit political dominance and adaptability. Some would argue that political dominance is subsumed in the term objective. This is not obvious in the doctrine. In Operations, FM 100-5, the term objective is used in OOTW exactly as it is for the U.S. Army principle of war, it is clearly not made subordinate to political objectives, nor is politics referred to specifically.<sup>4</sup> This is also true of the term objective as used in Peace Operations, FM 100-23, except that a political objective is mentioned. However, the political objective is not made dominant to the military's.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, the presence of three doctrinal manuals may convey that the military views LIC, OOTW and peace operations as separate and distinct. This is incorrect; they are all OOTW.<sup>6</sup> It may be inferred from this that the principles common to all of the doctrine; unity of effort, perseverance, and legitimacy, are widely accepted and probably where most errors have been committed. This should convey a deeper experience base and a broader understanding of their application by U.S. Army personnel. However, all of these concepts require discussion to fully understand the OOTW environment.

Political dominance is an important concept which means the political objectives take precedence over military objectives. All the military decision makers must understand the political objectives and the impact any military operations will have upon them. The political objective will drive military decisions at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. The military must adopt courses of action that support the political objective, even though these courses of action may appear unorthodox or be less efficient than traditional military operations in support of purely military objectives.<sup>7</sup>

The principle of unity of effort, like the principle discussed above stresses directing all actions and means to a common purpose. Integration of military efforts with other governmental agencies, and NGO/PVO's to gain a mutual advantage is important since each comes to the OOTW theater with limited resources. Unity of effort is a key to allowing the military to contribute to initiatives which are also political, economic, and psychological in nature. This process is complicated by numbers of nonmilitary organizational participants, including NGO/PVO's. There generally are no definitive command agreements between parties, and varying views of the objective desired. This creates a need for cooperation and consensus building to achieve unity of effort.<sup>8</sup> This may necessitate the military commander answering to a civilian chief, or at a minimum coordinating closely to permit effective action within the framework of our government system and the mandate for the operation.<sup>9</sup> Doctrine recommends establishing control structures such as a civil-military operations center (CMOC), which can facilitate transfer of information between organizations and provide

coherence to the activities of all elements in the area.<sup>10</sup> While the CMOC can be invaluable for coordination between organizations, it is not a control structure. Avoiding confusing and nebulous tasking is critical for efficient use of personnel and resources. This makes it important to create command and control structures, such as a Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF), and Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) that can work through a CMOC to achieve unity of effort with other interested parties.

The military must be able to respond in creative or unique ways to the changing situations found in OOTW. This requires a great deal of adaptability. The willingness and skill to modify methods and structures, or create new ones appropriate to different situations is required for success.<sup>11</sup>

Legitimacy is a central concern to all parties involved directly or indirectly in a conflict. It is derived from the perception that authority to take action is genuine, effective, and just. All parties must act through proper agencies for reasonable purposes. Legitimacy cannot be created by the military for itself, but must be conferred upon it by other agencies, parties, or the populace. The military must encourage and sustain its legitimacy by its actions. Commanders should be aware of the authority under which they operate and the relationship between it and the other sources of legitimacy that are present. When engaged in an operation where a clearly legitimate government does not exist, commanders should use extreme caution when dealing with individuals or organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them.<sup>12</sup> Additionally commanders must constantly consider

the impact of their actions and remain within their mandate. A perception of abuse, or injustice can lead to distrust and resentment and a corresponding loss of legitimacy. This will have a tendency to cause increased conflict and be counter to the national objectives.

Closely linked with legitimacy is the objective. Every military operation must be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. A mandate normally defines the objective for military forces, and is a resolution approved by a competent authorizing entity such as the UN Security Council or the U.S. Government. The mandate normally includes terms of reference (TOR) that delineate the role and tasks for the military force and resources to be used. The mandate will express the political objective and international support for the operation. It will also define the desired end state. The commander must limit his actions to those prescribed by the mandate to maintain legitimacy of the operation.

The mandate is unfortunately usually vague and subject to interpretation. This arises from wording chosen in the necessary compromises that accompany the political process. When this is the case every effort must be made to get a clear mandate. The military commander should take the initiative to restate and refine the mandate for consideration by higher authority. It may also be prudent for the military forces to state the intermediate objectives that they believe will support and assist in attaining the desired end state, and present these to the civilian authority. This notifies the civilian authority of the military intentions and allows a check for the suitability of the planned military operations.

Wherever military forces become involved, security is a concern. The force can significantly enhance its security by fostering its legitimacy and, when it can, its impartiality. Security can also be gained by demonstrating strong military capability and preparedness, including rules of engagement (ROE) that permit the use of force when necessary. Sustainment measures, and overt presence of uncommitted mobile combat power can also deter aggression against the force.

Even though the military force may be involved in operations that are nonhostile in their intent, it should not be assumed that this protects the forces. While security is important, it must be balanced with restraint, since the frequent or excessive use of force may adversely affect the mission's legitimacy. Also the use of force may meet short term goals, but actually impede the attainment of long term objectives. Commanders strive for force protection through the combined effects of legitimacy, impartiality and consent of parties, and prudent use of overwhelming force and ROE. It may not be possible to combine the effects of all of these principles. The commander should maximize the effects of as many of these principles as possible to ensure the security of the forces. The operations may necessarily require other agencies and organizations presence and participation to ensure success. Their security must be considered as well as that of military forces.

Particular attention may have to be paid to the principles of legitimacy, restraint, and use of force. The principle of restraint does not deny units or individuals their inherent right of self defense. Nor does it preclude use of sufficient or overwhelming force to establish situational dominance, to display resolve or commitment, and

to protect lives and property when required. However, restraint does affirm that only appropriate military force should be applied and it should be used prudently.<sup>13</sup>

OOTW, by its nature, is marked by protracted struggles. Rarely will there be a clear beginning or an instance where decisive actions culminate in an end with a decisive victor. Some sharp, and short encounters do occur but are best considered in the context of a long term contribution toward meeting objectives. Because of this, a resolute, persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives for as long as is necessary to achieve them is generally required. This does not preclude the taking of prompt, decisive action, but a careful analysis of the situation to select the right time and place for action is essential. Commanders must have a disciplined, focused attitude of perseverance that rejects short term successes in favor of actions that build toward the long term goals and objectives.<sup>14</sup>

All of these imperatives and principles must be melded together to formulate acceptable courses of action. A brilliant tactical success may accomplish a military objective. However, if it undermines legitimacy, is counter to the political objective, and causes more effort to be expended in political-and economic endeavors it is of little utility in the long run. Also methods that worked early in the conflict may not continue to work as the situation develops. Commanders must assess and reassess their environment and adapt their operations accordingly.

The doctrine for OOTW provides a general look at what the U.S. military forces ought to do in OOTW. To answer the research question

the thesis must also examine what SOF ought to do in OOTW. This will begin with what SOF do in general, regardless of the type of operation, then more specifically, what is done for OOTW.

#### Doctrine Used by SOF

The doctrine used by SOF will vary depending upon which SOF units are being employed. There is a certain amount of commonality in their doctrine in that they adhere to imperatives. These imperatives are a need to understand the operational environment, recognize the political implications, facilitate interagency activities, engage the threat discriminantly, consider the long-term effects, ensure that special operations activities are credible and legitimate, anticipate and control the psychological effects, apply capabilities indirectly, develop multiple options, provide for long term sustainment, provide sufficient intelligence, and balance security and synchronization. All of these have applicability in OOTW; some more than others. This rather long list encompasses the ideas of political dominance, restraint, legitimacy, perseverance, unity of effort, security, and adaptability. This may make SOF particularly well suited for OOTW.

An understanding of the operational environment requires assessment of political, economic, sociological, psychological, geographic, and military factors. This is necessary since SOF are not able to dominate the environment, they must thoroughly understand it before they act to influence it. SOF operators must be flexible and able to adapt to changing realities. They must also be able to anticipate these changes so that they may time their actions to take advantage of fleeting opportunities.<sup>15</sup>

SOF operators often conduct their missions to advance political objectives or create conditions for nonmilitary organizations to succeed. They must continually evaluate the political implications of their operations to ensure they support the political and nonmilitary objective.

SOF operators must anticipate ambiguous missions, conflicts in interests and objectives, and that many actors may operate in disunity. SOF must ask commanders for clear missions, and their intent, to facilitate coordination with all relevant parties. This is the essence of facilitating interagency activities.

The threat must be engaged discriminantly since SOF have limited resources that cannot be easily replaced and the use of SOF may have far-reaching political implications. When a general purpose force can be used to accomplish the objective they normally should be. SOF must educate commanders on their resources and capabilities so they may carefully select how, where, and why to use SOF. The idea of discriminantly engaging the threat implies action against a hostile party. This may not be the case in OOTW, especially for Civil Affairs Units (CA) or Psychological Operations Units (PSYOP), who may be heavily engaged in humanitarian assistance.

SOF must consider long term effects of their operation. They must operate within political and legal constraints to avoid strategic failure while gaining a tactical success. All of their operations must be consistent with the larger national and strategic objectives, since inconsistency can lead to a loss of support and undermine legitimacy. The desire for immediate or short term effects must be balanced with the

long term objective. Operations, policies, and plans should build toward the political end.

Legitimacy of SOF activities is based, not only on legal mandates or resolutions issued by competent authorizing agencies, but on a perception by involved parties that their methods and actions are moral and credible. Without this they would quickly lose the support of local populace, the U.S. population, and the international community. This assumes that support from these groups already exists, which may not be the case. One of the primary functions of PSYOP is to gain support for the operation. This doctrine is written as if it were broad in scope and applicable to all SOF, but it is primarily applicable to Army SF only.

Perception is often a greater effect than reality in determining the success or failure of special operations. The forces must anticipate and counter hostile propaganda and disinformation, while striving to enhance the perception of their mission by carefully integrating public affairs and psychological operations into their activities. There are problems with using PSYOP and public affairs to create perception, they attempt rather to correct misperceptions. Additionally, PSYOP and public affairs are separate by law. This may make coordination between the two difficult at best.

SOF operators must not take charge when working with a foreign government or group to avoid undermining support for their operation. They must forego tactical expediency to promote the long term credibility, sustainability, and self sufficiency of the supported group. The supported party must accept responsibility for the success

or failure of the combined operation. SF primarily advise, train, and assist the indigenous organizations in any operation,<sup>16</sup> while other types of SOF primarily advise and assist.

SOF plans are a common point of departure, not a rigid framework of execution. The personnel that will execute a mission are the personnel that plan and rehearse that mission. This is so that all personnel understand what elements are critical, why they were chosen and why other options were discarded, and what the underlying assumptions are in the plan. This maximizes the ability of SOF to adapt quickly to problems and events. They try to anticipate reactions and problems during the planning stage so that branch plans can be exercised, or built as required.

SOF operations require persistence, patience, and continuity of effort. Programs that are beyond economic, cultural norms, or technological capabilities of the supported party should not be undertaken. Programs that are predominantly funded from outside sources can be jeopardized if funding is lost. The strategy, policy, and planning for operations must take this into consideration so that programs started can be durable and consistent.

There must be a permanent and ongoing relationship with SOF units and their supporting intelligence agencies. Most SOF operations have unique, demanding requirements. Success often is dependent upon detailed, near real-time all source intelligence products. SOF do not have the combat power to confront unanticipated hostile actions. This creates a need unique to SOF for theater level intelligence products at the tactical level. SOF personnel must be sensitive to the burden this

puts on the intelligence assets and identify their intelligence requirements in priority, and differentiate between the essential and the nice to know.<sup>17</sup> The doctrine implies all SOF need robust intelligence support, when primarily only SF need this. CA brigades and PSYOP units normally operate in concert with other troops or civilian agencies and clearly do not require this kind of intelligence support. They do require a more mundane intelligence support that is often just as difficult for them to attain. This is overt human intelligence, that may come from conversations, debriefs, and reports from NGO/PVO, local government, and the populace.

Finally, there must be a balance between the security requirements that keep a mission from being compromised and the equally important aspect of ensuring that all personnel know enough to facilitate planning and coordination of the mission tasks.<sup>18</sup>

This brief look at general SOF doctrine is not sufficient to understand what SOF do in OOTW. These are basic principles which are built upon for more specific scenarios. This doctrine is written primarily for the Army SF operator, not CA or PSYOP since they operate in different capacities with different support requirements. While it is perhaps too ambitious to attempt to encompass all SOF in one document of general doctrine, it must be noted that some of the SOF imperatives are more applicable to certain SOF operators than others. The thesis will now examine what SOF doctrine says about OOTW.

#### SOF Doctrine in OOTW

Planning for contingency operations such as Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY adhere to the three unique principles of coordination,

balance, and planning for uncertainty. Planning must also consider among other constraints, all-source intelligence, command and control, PSYOP, CA, and public affairs support, and logistics.<sup>19</sup> Some types of evolutions SOF are involved in during a contingency operation are humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense, shows of force, nation support, and peace enforcement.<sup>20</sup> SOF must factor all of these considerations together when planning and executing missions in OOTW.

SOF must cooperate with government agencies and private organizations to manage sensitive situations. This may be as simple as providing advice on the capabilities and limitations of SOF resources, or planning coordinated efforts to accomplish mutual goals.

SOF must consider a balance of security for troops within the constraints of Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the political sensitivity of each situation. A balance must be struck between political goals and the scale, intensity, and nature of military operations used to support those goals.

Since these operations are filled with uncertainty, SOF require detailed, but flexible planning that incorporate the principles of coordination, and balance. This requires significant intelligence support to understand the political and social realities of the area of operation.

Some specialized SOF can be used as force multipliers when working with the various political and social factions. Psychological operations, and civil affairs units can be used to exploit enemy vulnerabilities and target audiences whose support is desired or crucial to success. They are ideally suited to both short and long term

commitments. These SOF units must be continuously prepared, regionally focused, and coordinate consistently with civilian and military authorities.<sup>21</sup>

Another OOTW mission that requires careful planning for the use of SOF is peace enforcement. As a mission, peace enforcement may look more like traditional military operations since it is used to restore order, stop violence, and return to political, diplomatic, and civil methods of conflict resolution. But since these operations have goals that are often nebulous, operations are best terminated when a settlement has been reached. This can be done by withdrawal or by transitions to peacekeeping forces. The peace enforcement forces are unlikely to have sufficient power to compel a lasting settlement and may find themselves attempting to govern hostile parties if a transition is not made to more diplomatic, autonomous methods quickly. A successful operation can remove a party that exercises local authority, creating a dirth of law enforcement capability, with looting and banditry to follow. This transition must be anticipated and planned for if the peace enforcers/peace keepers do not intend or desire to become the parties responsible for local law and order. This is primarily a function of CA personnel and MPs in conventional operations, and these units can fulfill these roles in OOTW also, but OOTW doctrine gives this problem cursory treatment.

The political complexities of peace enforcement require that the force is sufficient to compel, but use of force is applied with discretion. The ROE are restrictive since the purpose is to maintain law and order. Commanders must understand the political sensitivities

and constraints of the environment and recognize local law and customs that influence the operation.<sup>22</sup> SOF can assist the commander in this endeavor in several ways.

Special Forces (SF) can be used to conduct special reconnaissance to provide the commander with information concerning capabilities, intentions, and activities of disruptive influences.<sup>23</sup> Their geographic orientation, language skills and knowledge of local customs allow them to establish liaison with the local populace more effectively than conventional forces.<sup>24</sup> SF are used for certain shows of force because of their strategic capabilities.<sup>25</sup> They are effectively used to coordinate with host nations authorities, with or without additional U.S. combat forces, to show U.S. resolve and support for the host nation authority.

PSYOP should be part of the early planning stages of contingency operation to harvest their full potential.<sup>26</sup> They are used to control rumors, calm people's fears,<sup>27</sup> assess psychological impact of actions taken,<sup>28</sup> persuade the populace of the purpose and legitimacy of the operation to maintain population consent,<sup>29</sup> and improve popular support for the local government.<sup>30</sup> A show of force can also be used as a well orchestrated psychological operation.<sup>31</sup>

Civil Affairs personnel assist by informing civilian authorities of risks associated with proposed military plans, provide commanders with political, economic, social information and civil-military responsibilities in the area of interest, identify resources that will reduce risk, and identify in country facilities and local

resources.<sup>32</sup> They also provide training and support to SF involved in contingency operations.<sup>33</sup>

Humanitarian assistance is often required in contingency operations due to natural or manmade disasters. The assistance is provided to give immediate relief of human suffering, prevent loss of life or destruction of property, and promote welfare.<sup>34</sup>

SF are used to coordinate between civilian populace, government agencies, and private organizations.<sup>35</sup> SF personnel can also provide limited medical, dental, and veterinary care.<sup>36</sup> PSYOP provide information to the population about where to go for various types of relief, and advertise who is providing it. This builds trust and cooperation between interested parties.<sup>37</sup> Civil Affairs units are well suited to provide humanitarian relief. They may coordinate construction of rudimentary transportation systems, well drilling, basic sanitation facilities, and repair of other public facilities.<sup>38</sup>

Civil Affairs units can assist nations to promote their own development and growth. This is done to influence long term regional stability, build viable economies, and promote pluralistic governments with sound democratic institutions that are capable of orderly change. Civil Affairs personnel use their technical skill to develop resources in the host nation, thus minimizing lawlessness and subversion. They transfer their skill to the civilian and military community to build legitimacy for the U. S. operation and support for the host nation government.<sup>39</sup>

Commanders and SOF operators incorporate their unique capabilities into the planning process to maximize the potential for

success while economizing on the forces used. Planning in OOTW is different from more traditional uses of military forces since planners must consider the political implications of any course of action. Planning doctrine for OOTW considers other constraints on the conduct of military operations.

### Planning Doctrine for OOTW

The planning process for OOTW is the same as it is for other types of operations, but the considerations and emphasis are different. OOTW is a complex environment with changing circumstances and multinational and political dynamics that complicate planning. All commanders must work continuously with higher authorities to ensure they understand political goals, and their mission is clear and well defined.<sup>40</sup> Often these operations are time sensitive as well as politically sensitive,<sup>41</sup> making success often difficult to define and elusive.<sup>42</sup>

Peacetime contingency operations tend to develop incrementally, so planners develop a campaign plan to map out a direction to the desired end state. This helps commanders and political leaders visualize operational requirements, and link them with definable events to achieve the political, economic end state. Critical to defining successful plans are a clear mandate and TOR. Planners must also consider the effects and contributions of the media, NGO/PVO, coalition partners, and allies. Transition of responsibilities to nonmilitary civil agencies, and NGO/PVO is often the key to success.<sup>43</sup> Planners also identify and consider friendly and belligerent party centers of gravity.

Proper use of force is critical in OOTW. Planning should consider alternatives to use of force and apply them early to take advantage of their deterrent effect. Such measures are; the use of mediation and negotiation, population control measures such as road blocks, checkpoints, and curfews. Warnings, rewards and penalties, are also effective deterrents to the use of force.<sup>44</sup>

Well crafted ROE can prevent failure by ensuring U. S. forces and coalition forces understand the limits of force and when it can be used. ROE are the primary means for planners to ensure that the commander has conveyed legal, political, diplomatic and military guidance to the forces. The ROE must be tailored to the direction and strategy of the political leaders. They must balance the political and social situation with mission accomplishment while protecting the force.

Many of the considerations on use of force and deterrent effects also protect the forces. Other considerations are operational security, sanitation, safety, and avoidance of fratricide. In some operations deceptive measures may be used, but this should be done with care since it may undermine the forces' legitimacy.

Force training can prepare units for many of the situations that may arise during the campaign. This will give them a chance to exercise many of the force protection measures and practice the ROE. Forces at all levels should also be instructed how to request changes to the ROE.<sup>45</sup>

Planners consider the mandate and goals of the sponsoring authority when selecting forces for an operation. The forces selected must be deployable, sustainable, able to complete the mission, and able

to protect themselves. Suitability of forces will be determined by the mission analysis. The planner should fight the tendency to take more forces than needed for the mission, to hedge against uncertainty. While planning for worst case situations, the employment of more forces than is required for the mandate will weaken the legitimacy of the operation.

Planners must consider how combat functions will be applied in OOTW. Some functions may be different than in traditional war. Ranger forces can be used to support conventional combat forces, or used for direct action missions such as strike operations, and tactical reconnaissance. SF may assist in training and organizing local security forces, or assist in providing and securing relief supplies. They may be used in direct action to destroy certain facilities and military capabilities of belligerent forces. They may be the best force to use in initial assessment of engineering, medical, security, and intelligence in the area of interest. They can provide liaison with the local population, multinational forces, and nonmilitary agencies.

PSYOP can ensure that operational objectives and efforts are fully understood and supported by the target audience, by use of local information programs, radio, and television programs, and distribution of leaflets.

Civil Affairs units can assess the needs of civil authorities, and act as an interface between civil authorities and the military. They provide liaison to the civil populace, develop population and resource control measures, and coordinate with international support agencies.

Planners must consider the end state and transition strategies in the campaign plan. They must plan for the assimilation of private relief agencies and NGO/PVOs early in the operation. Funding and budget considerations must be resolved early to expedite the transfer of facilities and responsibilities to other forces and agencies.<sup>46</sup>

In the pamphlet An Agenda for Peace that he wrote at the direction of the United Nations Security Council, the current Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali discusses these issues under post-conflict peace-building. He notes that peace-building to be truly effective must seek to prevent the breakdown of peaceful conditions. This requires sustained, cooperative work to deal with the underlying economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems and place the achieved peace on a stable foundation.<sup>47</sup>

Public Affairs planners support open, independent reporting and access to units and soldiers to pursue a balanced, fair and credible presentation of the information that communicates the force commander's perspective through a quick, complete and accurate flow of information.

Planners must be concerned with the special requirement for legitimacy in OOTW. To promote this their plans should address the law of war, claims and liability and other fiscal considerations.<sup>48</sup>

There are other aspects of planning that must be considered. One other area that deserves special emphasis is command and control.

#### Command, Control, Coordination, and Liaison in OOTW

The U.S. has tried to avoid purely unilateral operations. This is done by obtaining sponsorship of the United Nations or other international or regional organization. Effectiveness of multinational

operations is improved by establishing rapport and harmony among senior commanders, and respecting the partners ideas, culture, religion, and customs.<sup>49</sup>

Commanders must consider the presence and capabilities of NGO/PVOs and coordinate and cooperate with their efforts. One method of accomplishing this is to establish a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). The CMOC may perform liaison and coordination between the military support structure, and other agencies with the NGO/PVOs. Commanders must understand the NGO/PVOs have valid missions and concerns, which may complicate the mission of U.S. forces. Relationship with them will be based on mutual respect, understanding of missions and goals, and standardization of support from the military. They are to be supported where feasible in compliance with the mandate and military objectives.<sup>50</sup> This is, unfortunately, the extent of doctrine concerning this, and implies that the U.S. has little experience working with NGO/PVOs.

Commanders and planners can facilitate interagency operations by establishing liaison officers (LNO). They are used to centralize direction and staff cognizance over planning coordination, and operations with external agencies and forces. The LNO should have rank and authority commensurate with their level of liaison and should be identified early in planning.<sup>51</sup>

#### Summary and Conclusions

The principles of unity of effort, perseverance, and legitimacy are universal in all doctrinal publications for SOF, and OOTW. This implies that all SOF personnel are familiar with these concepts and that

commanders should emphasize them in planning. Additionally these principles were closely tied with the other principles of security, objective, political dominance. Political ends define the objective, which is the enabler for unity of effort. These political ends must be perceived as just, and moral to convey legitimacy to the operation. Finally the involved parties must demonstrate perseverance to achieve the goals.

Future success in OOTW will require coordination, and cooperation with a variety of NGO/PVOs. There is very little doctrine concerning this important topic. This leaves commanders to develop ad hoc procedures for each operation. This may provide solutions in the short term, but long term understanding and consistency with large NGO/PVOs will not be developed this way.

The thesis will use Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY as a case study for OOTW doctrine. It will focus on NSAs and their impact on SOF operations. The object of the study is to determine if SOF personnel using the doctrine were able to accomplish the objectives of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY with cooperation of some NSAs and others clearly opposed to the goals of the operation.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Joint Chiefs, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994), 118.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1990), 1-5.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid. 1-7.

<sup>4</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1993), 13-3.

<sup>5</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994), 15.

<sup>6</sup>FM 100-5, 13-4 to 13-8.

<sup>7</sup>FM 100-20, 1-5.

<sup>8</sup>FM 100-23, 16.

<sup>9</sup>FM 100-20, 1-5

<sup>10</sup>FM 100-23 16.

<sup>11</sup>FM 100-20, 1-5 and 1-6.

<sup>12</sup>FM 100-23, 18.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid. 15 to 17.

<sup>14</sup>FM 100-20, 1-6.

<sup>15</sup>U.S. Army, FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1991), 2-15.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid. 2-15 to 2-17.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid. 2-18.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid. 2-18.

<sup>19</sup>FM 100-20, 5-1 to 5-2.

<sup>20</sup>FM 100-5, 13-5 to 13-7.

<sup>21</sup>FM 100-20, 5-2 to 5-3.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid. 5-7.

<sup>23</sup>U.S. Army, FM 31-20, Doctrine for Speceal Forces Operations (Washington, D.C.: 1990), 3-4.

<sup>24</sup>U.S. Joint Chiefs, JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washington, D.C.: 1992), 1-10.

<sup>25</sup>FM 31-20, 3-7.

<sup>26</sup>U.S. Army, FM 33-1, Psychological Operations (Washington, D.C.: 1993), 3-30.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid. 3-9.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid. 3-18.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid. 3-28.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid. 3-17.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid. 3-30.

<sup>32</sup>U.S. Army, FM 41-40, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, D.C.: 1993), 3-7 and 3-8.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid. 3-4.

<sup>34</sup>FM 100-5, 13-5.

<sup>35</sup>FM 31-20, 3-5.

<sup>36</sup>FM 100-5, 13-5.

<sup>37</sup>FM 33-1, 3-30.

<sup>38</sup>FM 100-5, 13-5.

<sup>39</sup>FM 41-40, 3-5.

<sup>40</sup>FM 100-23, 31.

<sup>41</sup>FM 100-20, 5-1.

<sup>42</sup>FM 100-23, 31.

<sup>43</sup>FM 100-23, 31 to 33.

<sup>44</sup>FM 100-23, 34.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid. 35 to 38.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid. 39 to 41.

<sup>47</sup>Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992), 33.

<sup>48</sup>FM 100-23, 47-49.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid. 21.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid. 26-28.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid. 29.

CHAPTER THREE  
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS

Background Information

Understanding events in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY requires knowledge of the interests of some of the actors with a political stake in the outcome. While there are many NSAs in Haiti, among the NSAs considered in this chapter are FRAPH, Lavalas, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, and the International Committee for the Red Cross. This background information provides insights into the motives and goals of two of the most powerful groups in Haiti at the time of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY; FRAPH and Lavalas.

Lavalas is a popular and political movement in Haiti<sup>1</sup> that supported Jean Bertrand Aristide for the presidency. Lavalas is rooted in socialism and supportive of those espousing liberation theology in the Catholic Church. There is broad-based social and political support for the Lavalas movement in Haiti that encompasses several organizations and political parties, including Organization for Popular Lavalas (OPL),<sup>2</sup> and the National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD), which is the party affiliation of Jean Bertrand Aristide. The FNCD also includes the Congress of Democratic Movements (CONACOM).<sup>3</sup> Also affiliated with Lavalas are the Papaye Peasants Movement (MPP),<sup>4</sup> the Open the Gate Party (PLB),<sup>5</sup> Movement for the Organization of the Country (MOP),<sup>6</sup> the Grand' Anse Resistance Coordination, the Union of Peoples Forces of the North,<sup>7</sup>

the Confederation of Democratic Unity (KID), and the National Progressive Democratic Party of Haiti (PNDPH).<sup>8</sup>

Of the political parties that support Lavalas, KID, PNDPH, CONACOM, and FNCD were the driving Lavalas groups in 1990 under the banner of the quality rooster. They were conspicuously absent when the new Lavalas coalition of OPL, PLB and MOP formed on March 15, 1995, under the banner of four men around a table. This new party banner was supposed to represent the unity of the Lavalas movement, but the new coalition had in mind to set its own agenda separate from the desires of the old core group. They believed the old group had become too mainstream and eager to pander to the desires of outside influences. The new backers of Lavalas did form their coalition, and they invited anyone not involved in the 1991 coup d'etat who would respect the rules of the democratic game.<sup>9</sup> Evans Paul, leader of the FNCD, stated that he thought the FNCD should merge with Lavalas since it is what the population expects and is what is good for the country.<sup>10</sup> However, the FNCD did not reconcile its differences with Lavalas. FNCD participated in the elections for the parliament and the presidency on its own, and lost in both of the elections to the united Lavalas platform.

The Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) was formed in mid 1993, according to its leader Emmanuel Constant, at the urging of the Defense Intelligence Agency<sup>11</sup> and was paid by the CIA<sup>12</sup> to balance the extreme of the Lavalas movement.<sup>13</sup> This nearly coincides with the signing of the Governors Island accord where the Cedras regime agreed to reinstate President Aristide to power in Haiti, and it appears that FRAPH was intended to be a legitimate opposition to the

extremes of the liberation theology of President Aristide. What was needed was a catalyst to get the organization going. In October of 1993, FRAPH members demonstrated on the pier in Port au Prince to prevent the docking of the USS Harlan County. When the ship left for Guantanamo Bay the organization of FRAPH was solidified. Emmanuel Constant, the leader of FRAPH stated,

My people kept wanting to run away... but I took the gamble and urged them to stay. Then the Americans pulled out! we were astonished. That was the day FRAPH was actually born. Before everyone said we were crazy, suicidal, that we would all be burned if Aristide returned. But now we know he is never going to return.<sup>14</sup>

This was success beyond anything the FRAPH leader had expected and undoubtedly boosted membership in the new organization. Since President Aristide was popular with the masses, it could clearly be expected that there would be opposition to an organization set on preventing his return. There was an assassination of a FRAPH member in December of 1993, and in retaliation FRAPH set a fire in Cite Soleil, the largest shanty town of Port au Prince. Thirty people were killed and 100 housing units were destroyed.<sup>15</sup> FRAPH claimed that the fire was set as a means of self defense.<sup>16</sup>

By late April 1994 Lavalas, existing as an underground movement, was becoming a more aggressive opposition to FRAPH and the Cedras regime. Marc Lamour, an activist for Lavalas and a former official in the Aristide government, was leading an armed insurgency of approximately 250 men in an area southwest of Cap Haitien. Elements of this group conducted a surprise attack on a military post, and killed five soldiers.<sup>17</sup>

The situation in Haiti continued to deteriorate over the next months and the United States decided to intervene. Part of the planning for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY focused on restoring order to the beleaguered nation. Two aspects of this were that the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), and the Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC) were established at Ft. Drum under control of JTF 190,<sup>18</sup> and the decision for a weapons buy back program was made. These decisions were made in mid September before the invasion. The invasion was anticipated to be quick since the HACC and CMOC were to arrive in Haiti on D+1 and the buy back program was to start in Phase III of the Operation, which was anticipated to be D+3.<sup>19</sup>

#### The Intervention Begins

On 19 September 1994, U.S. troops conducted an unopposed landing in Haiti. Lavalas officials refused to meet with the U.S. delegation during their talks with provisional President Emile Jonassaint. This was probably due to Jonassaint's close association with the negotiations to allow the landing and his support by the Haitian military. Several other parties, including FNCD, did meet with the delegation, which was led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter.<sup>20</sup>

Shortly after the U.S. troops arrived, the CIA reported that Joseph Michel Francois, Chief of the Port-au-Prince police force, was against the accord that allowed the unopposed landing of troops. They also reported that Francois and Philippe Biamby, the head of the Haitian Armed forces, were searching to kill Cedras.<sup>21</sup> Thus, it is clear that the other people in power in Haiti did not support the arrangement that

Cedras and Jonassaint had made, and U.S. impartiality and legitimacy might be challenged by the Haitian Military.

The people of Haiti were on edge as soldiers began moving into their country, just after a convoy of U.S. soldiers arrived in the Port au Prince waterfront, hundreds of Haitians, organized by Lavalas, demonstrated in favor of the return of ousted President Aristide. This was the first incident to occur since U.S. troops arrived in Haiti, and it was the first time in three years Lavalas members had taken to the streets to support their overthrown leader.<sup>22</sup>

Haitian police beat several demonstrators with metal pipes and rifle butts, and kicked them but did not fire any shots. Several Lavalas demonstrators hid behind cars and threw stones at the Haitian policemen, clearly taking advantage of the presence of foreign journalists and the U.S. military convoy.<sup>23</sup>

On 20 September the U.S. began to insert SF teams throughout the country side,<sup>24</sup> but Haitian soldiers continued to beat demonstrators in an effort to maintain control of the populace. These actions prompted LTG Shelton to demand an end of the repression in Haiti in a radio address on 21 September. He stated that if the Haitian forces of order continued to resort to disproportionate force, the U.S. forces would take further steps to stop the violence.<sup>25</sup>

In a separate radio address the following day, Emmanuel Constant called for "total cooperation with the peace committee and the Haitian Armed Forces." In what appears to be a tactical retreat, he urged FRAPH members not to confront the U.S. soldiers. Constant noted for the listeners that FRAPH was not a paramilitary group and he denied

that FRAPH members carried firearms. He also invited the Haitian Armed Forces to search his offices. Constant expressed a desire to meet with LTG Shelton to decide how the FRAPH could cooperate.<sup>26</sup> "From now on democracy will be achieved through elections," Constant said as he promised to conduct a loyal opposition to Aristide.<sup>27</sup> He said that he was opposed to U.S. intervention, but said that since the U.S. troops were there to provide technical assistance he would cooperate, but if the technical assistance later became a trap they [FRAPH] would confront the Americans.<sup>28</sup>

Little changed over the next two days, the FRAPH and Haitian Armed forces remained in positions of authority and apparently accepted the presence of U.S. troops. This created an uneasy tension that was finally broken on 24 September when a Marine patrol, from the Special Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), became involved in a fire fight with Haitian police in Cap Haitien. Ten Haitian police were killed, one marine was wounded.<sup>29</sup> This marked an end to U.S. toleration of the status quo in Haiti. The Haitian police and armed forces would be very wary of the U.S. and the people began to provide U.S. troops with more information and cooperation.

Perhaps because of this, U.S. forces felt that they could begin to establish a more secure environment and planned to begin the weapons buy back program on 28 September.<sup>30</sup> This was a mark that the operation had moved into phase III of the U.S. plan. The weapons buy back was to start about a week later than had initially been anticipated, giving one indication that the initial effort to make Haiti a stable and secure

environment by cooperating with the police and armed forces had not been fruitful.

Although the fire fight in Cap-Haitien suppressed violence by the Haitian Armed Forces, the members of FRAPH were not dissuaded. On 28 September, FRAPH personnel hurled stones at hundreds of pro-Aristide demonstrators and shot at some as they marched down Champ de Mars, the street leading to FRAPH headquarters.<sup>31</sup> Constant said the U.S. troops were no longer on a peace mission but had become an occupation. He urged shop owners to close their shops and Haitian people to stay indoors to prevent violent incidents. This was said in anticipation of the protest organized for 29 September, one day before the third anniversary of the coup that ousted Aristide.<sup>32</sup> It appears that FRAPH was attempting to establish its own control over Haitian society since the Haitian Armed Forces had lost their potency. These statements were a direct challenge to U.S. authority and a clear attempt to incite a negative reaction to the U.S. presence.

Lavalas continued to conduct protests despite the FRAPH statement. Following a requiem mass at the Port au Prince Cathedral, to commemorate the third anniversary of the victims of the 30 September coup d'etat that ousted President Aristide, Lavalas and other pro-Aristide demonstrators marched down Rue de l'Enterrement. FRAPH members clashed with the demonstrators as they marched past FRAPH headquarters. Stones were thrown, then FRAPH and the demonstrators clashed with clubs and stones.<sup>33</sup> There were two dead and five wounded as a result of the clash. There were no U.S. military present during the clash, but U.S. troops had to be called to control the situation.<sup>34</sup> This was different

since previously reporters had noted that crowds were using the presence of the troops to their own advantage, and they began a demonstration this time without troops present.

This same day CJTF 180 Civil Affairs completed an initial assessment of Haiti. The report also noted that crowds used the presence of U.S. troops as a cover for mob violence against the Haitian Armed Forces, even though the primary purpose of the assessment was to determine what civil affairs projects were already in progress and what additional actions needed to be taken. The report noted that there were over 200 Humanitarian Relief Organizations in Haiti primarily concentrating on food distribution and limited health care. The report recommended that infrastructure revitalization be undertaken as part of a coordinated economic development program.<sup>35</sup> A key to the transition of the main effort of the U.S. forces to civil affairs programs was the imposition of order in Haiti. This needed to begin in earnest so that the U.S. could seize the initiative. It appears that Lavalas was demonstrating to provoke the Haitian Armed Forces and FRAPH, believing that the U.S. would be called to break up the riot. There were several ways that U.S. forces could attempt to preclude future clashes of Aristide supporters with the Haitian Armed Forces and FRAPH. Evidently the decision was made to make the Haitian Armed Forces and FRAPH non threatening through disarming and arresting them.

#### Imposing Order

Beginning with the first day of October, U.S. Special Forces took control of the Haitian Army installations at Ouanamithe, St. Michel, and Belladere.<sup>36</sup> The next day the plan to seize FRAPH command

and control nodes was issued.<sup>37</sup> U.S. troops also seized weapons caches in Habitation Le Clerc and the Famosa tomato paste factory, which belonged to Cedras' palace guard, the so-called Black Ninjas.<sup>38</sup>

On the third of October, U.S. soldiers invaded FRAPH headquarters and made about 50 arrests. A weapons cache of some 30 guns was found in the headquarters. The radio station Celeste FM, which reportedly had ties to FRAPH was also occupied by military police.

The actions by U.S. troops did not pass without reaction from both FRAPH and Lavalas. Following the raid at FRAPH headquarters, people hostile to the organization, probably Lavalas, entered the building and destroyed furniture. Meanwhile, at another FRAPH building located in Carrefour, some Aristide supporters watched U.S. troops search the area for weapons, then ransacked and set fire to the building, and followed this by staging the largest demonstration ever held in Haiti.<sup>39</sup> They claimed the building was set ablaze to stop the stealing, raping, and killing in the country.<sup>40</sup>

FRAPH was less spontaneous. Constant claimed he met with the CIA's Haiti chief, John Kambourian<sup>41</sup> in the afternoon of 3 October 94. FRAPH met in Garande River Du Norde. SOF found out about the meeting and reported it so that the FRAPH members could be arrested. Josephat, a FAD'H officer with FRAPH ties, chaired the meeting but escaped before 2d BCT arrived to break up the meeting. Seventy-five FRAPH members were detained.<sup>42</sup>

Constant reacted with a statement that if the U.S. military were to do this to all the political parties it would be a violation of human and political rights. Constant said that FRAPH had always

mitigated in favor of what was going on then and looked for an honorable way out of the crisis. If there was a basis for formal complaint he didn't understand why. He was ready for the Haitian Department of Justice to charge him.<sup>43</sup>

This statement was apparently issued to convince U.S. troops that they didn't understand the nature of FRAPH or Haiti, but FRAPH did react violently and quickly. That same day SSG Donald Holstead, of ODA 336, at Les Cayes was involved in a shooting incident. He was wounded in the abdomen and shot two of his four assailants. The assailants were all Haitian soldiers thought to be acting for FRAPH.<sup>44</sup>

SOF began to get reports that FRAPH members may have been targeting U.S. forces and Aristide supporters with unspecified attacks. There was an unconfirmed report that FRAPH had declared war on U.S. forces in Cap Haitien.<sup>45</sup> In response to the shooting of SSG Holstead, one Ranger company was sent to Les Cayes as a show of force.<sup>46</sup>

The destruction of his offices, the ineffectiveness of FRAPH attacks, and the quick response by the Ranger company apparently had an intimidating effect on Constant, since on 4 October he met with LTG Shelton.<sup>47</sup> LTG Shelton wanted Constant's cooperation and told him "Here's your chance. Either you do it or we'll hunt you down like a dog."<sup>48</sup> He also remarked at his morning brief that FRAPH's leader, Emmanuel Constant would say publicly that FRAPH would support Aristide, and urge others to do so also.<sup>49</sup> A few hours later Constant held a press conference. At the conference, Constant was protected by U.S. troops. The speech he read was written by U.S. Embassy spokesman, Stanley Shrager.<sup>50</sup> In his speech, Constant said that he would support

Aristide's return in the framework of "constructive opposition." Constant called on FRAPH members to remain peacefully active and participate in the reconstruction and democratic process. Although Constant spoke under the protection of U.S. military police he denied that any deal had been struck with the U.S. He noted that one of his objectives was "to have no more repeats of [yesterday's] incident."<sup>51</sup>

Even with this though, FRAPH had not ceased as an organization and may have been looking for ways to continue to influence events in Haiti. An Air Force AC 130 gunship was launched to assist a Special Forces ODA team that was drawing fire, from unknown sources. The U.S. forces needed to continue to be as responsive to threats to SOF as it had been in Les Cayes. Additionally a message was intercepted about FRAPH leaders planning violence on U.S. forces. JTF 190 received a report that FRAPH and attaches were monitoring U.S. radio nets. The U.S. noted that their communications security was atrocious.<sup>52</sup> Lavalas maintained a low profile during all of this, apparently wanting to avoid similar attention from the U.S. military.

While this was going on, there were other demands of the U.S. troops in Haiti. The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) asked again for U.S. assistance in trying to get into Haitian prisons to check living conditions. JTF 190 was willing to assist but needed guidance from the Department of State.<sup>53</sup>

On the fifth of October, the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti and the deputy CINC went to Cap Haitien to see the projects accomplished by Special Forces there. They noted that the town had a water pump problem, but that the CMOC already knew of the problem and was searching

for a solution. The ambassador and deputy CINC also met with the Special Forces ODA team in Garande-River-du-Norde. The populace was firmly in support of the 9 man team, and the 25 members of the Haitian army that were stationed there had drifted into the background. This was apparently indicative of the general state of police and the Armed Forces in Haiti. Throughout Haiti U.S. military police and international police monitors were trying to hold the Haitian Armed Forces together. This was being done because the military police felt the Haitian Armed Forces must be kept operational to maintain law and order. If they were disbanded the U.S. forces had two choices, be the police or have no police.<sup>54</sup>

Despite the concerns that the Haitian Armed Forces and police were about to disband, on 6 October U.S. soldiers arrested and imprisoned 15 more Haitian soldiers and seized another weapons cache. These U.S. soldiers also came upon and inspected a prison holding 40 people, thirty of whom were packed into one cell.<sup>55</sup>

Meanwhile, policy toward FRAPH had been changed, confusing some SOF personnel. In an interview with Allan Nairn of The Nation, Col. Mark Boyatt of Army Special Forces remarked, "When we first went in we went after the FRAPH real hard. . . but after that we were told to 'back off'." He also said that the order came down through the chain of command to treat FRAPH as the "loyal opposition."<sup>56</sup>

It appears that a united effort on the part of U.S. forces to restore law and order did not exist at that time. The military police strove to maintain a functioning Haitian Armed Force, while SOF raided and arrested them. Additionally, guidance was given to SOF to treat

FRAPH as a loyal opposition when they were clearly opposed to Aristide's return and had repeatedly used violence against Aristide supporters.

The same special treatment given to FRAPH apparently did not extend to the Haitian Armed Forces because, on 7 October, Special Forces stationed in Gonaives arrested another 23 Haitian soldiers in an arms raid on Saint-Marc and seized a truckload of weapons.<sup>57</sup>

A resolution to this apparent disparity may be that the Haitian Armed Forces would eventually have to be replaced anyway with another body responsible for law and order since their reputation for excessive violence was so bad that the populace would never accept them. Further, senior U.S. officials might have received assurances that FRAPH would behave in a lawful manner, and it was in the U.S. interest to have a more conservative political viewpoint active in Haiti than the socialism of Lavalas.

There is some evidence to support this because, on the 7th of October, Aristide supporters staged the first demonstration since the U.S. troops took action against FRAPH. This demonstration was organized in part by the independent confederation of trade unions, and it was held without incident.<sup>58</sup> Additionally, during these days various Haitian reform groups began to resurface after spending 3 years underground. Fred Pierre returned to his home in Cap-Haitien after being in hiding since September 1991. He was an organizer for the activist group Coordination of Operation Lavalas. There were divisions in the activist groups between moderates and militants. Moderates detested the dechoukaj, or violent street justice, while militants

supported the forceful overthrow of the current political and economic structure.<sup>59</sup>

The same heavy handed tactics used by SOF when dealing with the Haitian Armed Forces may have given other organizations the feeling that the U.S. was about to take charge of everything. CJTF 180 was working with several Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HRO) on food distribution. They were all concerned that U.S. forces would try to dictate the pace and scope of food distribution or just take over the distribution in some areas. CJTF 180 recommended that U.S. forces not become directly involved in food distribution, but work with HRO's to identify shortfalls in their food and service distribution efforts. Vehicle parts, tires, and fuel were in short supply, hindering food distribution, but CJTF 180 felt that they would become available after the embargo was lifted, and the problem would then resolve itself.<sup>60</sup>

There were over 200 HRO's in Haiti, many had been working there a number of years. U.S. forces had been providing security, space available transportation, and other services as requested within force capabilities.<sup>61</sup> CJTF 180 also requested, via CINCUSACOM, interagency processes to assist nation building, since long term solutions to Haiti's problems were beyond their capability.<sup>62</sup>

Throughout rural Haiti on 9 October, SOF were still trying to maintain order. Special forces found a large weapons cache in the Grande Saline area. This area had become a hot bed of FRAPH activity, and the Haitian Armed Forces would do nothing about it. This left the SF ODA team to deal with the problem. One shot was fired at the ODA team, but there were no casualties.<sup>63</sup> In the town of Miragoane, a pro-

Cedras driver crashed his bus into a crowd of pro-Aristide demonstrators, killing 14 and injuring others. The initial effort to establish a new local police force in Cap-Haitien failed when residents rejected the former military members trained by international police monitors.<sup>64</sup> In response, SOF were repositioned throughout Haiti to promote a stable environment.<sup>65</sup>

President Aristide was scheduled to return to Haiti on the 15th of October. SOF received several reports that FRAPH was planning violence through out Haiti on the day of Aristide's return.<sup>66</sup> Haitian on Haitian violence was getting worse as the return of Aristide drew near. The USAID office held a meeting to plan for his return, a topic of the meeting was the use of psychological operations (PSYOP) to prepare the populace.<sup>67</sup>

As Aristide's return approached, many Civil Affairs projects aimed at health care were ongoing,<sup>68</sup> and JTF 190 provided lubricants to the Catholic Relief Services (CRS).<sup>69</sup> Tension continued to grow between pro-Cedras groups and Aristide supporters, but the U.S. apparently felt that enough control had been established to redeploy the Ranger Company at Les Cayes to GTMO.<sup>70</sup> General Cedras and Biamby arrived in Panama;<sup>71</sup> perhaps the U.S. believed this would relieve much of the tension.

With less than 48 hours remaining until Aristide's return, Constant held a press conference. During the conference he stated that it was time for festivities, not fear. Everyone in the field was determined to fight for valid reasons, not personal interest. When asked what he thought about statements that some Haitians wanted FRAPH

members tried, he said that first there must be reforms of the judicial system. The people could not deliver justice on their own.<sup>72</sup>

Constant's speech suggests that there was acceptance of Aristide's return. There were also reports that Emmanuel Constant was trying to take over the political wing of FRAPH and turn it into a legitimate party.<sup>73</sup> This supports the statements he made earlier that he would use FRAPH to conduct his loyal opposition. However, some were still not willing for Aristide to return. Second Fleet made a report to JTF 180 of an assassination plot at the airport that included the names of four conspirators. Also to preclude the possibility that sufficient force could be used to depose Aristide, JSOTF and JTF 180 destroyed confiscated weapons larger than the M-60 machine gun before 2400 on 14 October.<sup>74</sup> The JPOTF was involved in many tasks to prepare for Aristide's return, including painting and radio broadcasts.<sup>75</sup>

Meanwhile Lavalas was ready for Aristide to return, and evidence suggests they were trying to gain influence throughout Haiti by various strong man tactics. For example, Deputy Paris Moise called Mark Clark of the Embassy and reported that his supporters were being threatened by Lavalas in Cote De For, a small town south east of Jacmel. Leaders of Lavalas, Yonel Nason and Codefrey Germain and others had threatened to burn down the houses and attack Joseph A. Tibau, Judome Felix, Gerard Joseph, and John W. Joseph. Deputy Moise requested that U.S. forces be deployed to the area.<sup>76</sup>

On October 16th, the day after Aristide's return, the JSOTF found a new weapons cache at Dessaline barracks,<sup>77</sup> and rioting in the Port-au-Prince slums claimed the lives of two FRAPH supporters.<sup>78</sup>

The ICRC again asked U.S. forces to provide information on confinement facilities. Specifically where facilities were located, whether active, emptied, or especially good or bad. LTG Shelton agreed to support this request.<sup>79</sup> This was evidently important to the ICRC since they continued to ask. Earlier U.S. forces was willing to comply with what appears to be a routine request for information, but wanted guidance from the State Department. After repeated requests LTG Shelton agreed to assist. On 20 October CA reported that humanitarian assistance funds had dried up. CA would only be able to assess civic projects until more funds were made available.<sup>80</sup> This suggests that support to humanitarian assistance was a lower priority than security operations, almost to the point of being ignored. Despite this, progress was being made, and possibly what the NGO's needed most was security. Three cooperating sponsors of the U.N. Title II feeding program, CARE, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) continued to experience problems with looting. Collaboration with U.S. forces had minimized risks in delivering food to feeding centers. The military offered all assistance available within the confines of the ROE. ADRA delivered food to the Central Plateau, and CARE delivered food in the Gonaives area.<sup>81</sup>

There were several examples that demonstrated security was still an issue. The Haitian parliament passed a bill outlawing paramilitaries, the aim of which was to dismantle FRAPH. A bus drove into a crowd in Cap Haitien and killed 10 people.<sup>82</sup> This was the second incident of this type. On 21 October, FRAPH was still active in the Belladere area, they had interfered with the development of the town.

ARSOTF forces detained the Belladere district commandant for his own safety. He was accused by the populace of being the local FRAPH leader and beating prisoners. SF personnel conducted presence patrols in Belladere and Ouanamithe over 3 days to deter violence and enhance stability.<sup>83</sup>

On 23 October, the ARSOTF continued aggressive patrolling throughout Haiti. Special forces continued to provide assistance to local authorities in outlying areas, including delivering a baby by cesarean section. Local governments were beginning to take charge in their respective areas.<sup>84</sup>

Also on October 23d, CMOC received a call, from Michel Jean-Pierre, reporting rioting and shooting in La Caserne at St. Michelle de L'attalaye, east of Gonaives. The rioters were 20 to 30 men probably FRAPH and Haitian Armed Forces. Jean-Pierre stated that these activities began as soon as U.S. forces left the area. Jean-Pierre and many others wanted U.S. forces do more patrols as soon as possible.<sup>85</sup>

PSYOP began a campaign on October 25th to educate Haitians about democracy,<sup>86</sup> while more than 1,200 special forces troops continued to operate out of 27 towns in the effort to keep paramilitary groups on the run.<sup>87</sup>

On 26 October an unknown NGO operating in the Gonaives area reported to the SF detachment that 2 personnel of the Haitian Armed Forces had been killed in St. Michel by a mob wielding machetes and sticks.<sup>88</sup> Investigations revealed that the Haitian soldiers were asked to serve a warrant by the local justice. They elected to do this without asking for U.S. assistance. A crowd gathered around the

soldiers, became unruly, and became even more frenzied when the soldiers fired warning shots in the air. The crowd began throwing rocks, and wielding machetes, killed 2 soldiers and wounded 2 others. A PSYOP Team was kept standing by to get the facts out to the people as they became available.<sup>89</sup>

These events were not isolated to any one group. Lavalas had started causing problems in some regions of Haiti. The JPOTF continued the campaign to educate Haitians about democracy, they began stressing that democracy is not vengeance.<sup>90</sup> By late October, SOF evaluated that most local judges in Haiti were corrupt. Additionally, U.S. forces in Port au Prince continued to be sent on wild goose chases to protect warehouses from looting. They became frustrated with this and recognized that it must stop.<sup>91</sup>

Special Forces ODA teams became increasingly involved in responding to calls for police action. FOB 33 reported 24 responses in 96 hours, including calls to investigate a homicide, pickpocketing, theft, assault, and a mob attack on a Haitian soldier at Ft. Liberte. At FOB 31 there were fewer requests for assistance, but ODA teams were called for 7 assaults, 5 burglaries, 3 robberies, and 7 threats.<sup>92</sup>

On the first day of November, ARSOTF forces observed Haitian Armed Forces in Jeremie arrest two Lavalas members for throwing rocks. The arrest was conducted professionally, but one hour later Lavalas members began throwing rocks again. ARSOTF moved the families [targeted by the rock throwing], who were possibly FRAPH, for their protection. Lavalas destroyed the houses later in the day.<sup>93</sup>

Throughout the rest of November events became more benign, and in December the Haitian Justice Department became functional. On the 8th of December they summoned Emmanuel Constant and Louis Jodel Chambelain on charges of attempted murder and physical torture. Constant and his lawyer were to appear in court at 1000 on 12 December. He failed to appear for his court appointment, but asked the judge to postpone his appointment until Monday 19 December and demanded safety guarantees.<sup>94</sup>

In a separate effort, apparently an attempt to rally some public support and avoid a trial for their leadership, FRAPH held a press conference. The spokesman, Wily Paul, stated that the word was reconciliation; Lavalas and FRAPH members were brother and sister. This provoked a violent reaction from the crowd.<sup>95</sup>

By the 9th of January, Emmanuel Constant evidently realized that with new laws, a court summons, and no popular support, that events in Haiti were clearly against him. He fled the country for the United States to escape Haitian justice,<sup>96</sup> and when he left the policy of FRAPH acting as a legal opposition to Lavalas failed.

After this there were still problems with security in Haiti, but it appears that violence became more focused toward consolidating power, and posturing for upcoming elections.

#### Preparing for Elections

In a separate incident earlier on January 9th, U.S. forces in Delmas 3 exchanged gunfire with a group of bandits. The group of armed individuals invaded Delmas 3 at about 0130. They were driven back by

the U.S. troops and two of the bandits were apprehended. One Haitian woman was killed.<sup>97</sup>

That same day in Miragoane, a particularly anti U.S. faction of Lavalas, OPL, culminated a weeks worth of posturing to gain political clout for the upcoming elections. They were uncooperative with the U.S. and steadily increased confrontations with the ODA team during the week. They finally arranged for port security, who were OPL supporters, to lock all the gates and offices and steal the keys. They also intimidated workers to leave the port area. This shut down the port facilities, and cost merchants, ship owners and the government thousands of dollars.

ARSOTF recommended taking control of the port, streets and traffic control. They asked to turn port security over to the Interim Provisional Security Force (IPSF). They preceded the operation with a PSYOP mission explaining that the port closure hurt the economy and the revenue was needed to improve water, electricity, and roads. The ARSOTF remained in Miragoane until the IPSF could be used to cover the port security and International Police Monitors (IPM) or other U.N. forces were in place. ARSOTF felt it was important to demonstrate U.S. resolve and that they had the interests of all Haitians in mind. If they failed to act forcefully and decisively, a lack of resolve would be demonstrated and invite others to try similar acts.<sup>98</sup>

Lavalas performed acts of intimidation in other regions of Haiti. On 12 January Regis Olipcial, a member of the Haitian Chamber of Deputies representing a party from the right, called the U.S. Embassy for assistance in contacting the ODA team in Jeremie. He wanted to

leave Jeremie to go to Port au Prince. His problem was that local leftists threatened to burn his rental car if he tried to leave. He believed that the threats were to prevent politicians from visiting their constituencies and campaigning for upcoming elections. Olipcial asked the Haitian police in Jeremie for help, they refused. He asked them to help him notify the U.S. special forces, and they refused. As a last resort he contacted the embassy for assistance.<sup>99</sup>

Beginning in the middle of January a pattern of burglaries and assassinations developed. On the 18th, six heavily armed individuals broke into Radio Haiti Inter, a private radio station in Drouillard. They took radio equipment and spare parts.<sup>100</sup> On the 20th the Grand-Goave Barracks were robbed. The bandits took 4 M-1 rifles, 23 cartridges, 4 loaders, uniforms, and a radio cassette player.<sup>101</sup> Several gunmen assassinated Haitian Army Adjutant, Kebreon Josephon on February 3rd. Individuals, who were heavily armed and wearing black, robbed a police station in Jeremie on February 4th. They stole everything including military equipment.<sup>102</sup> On the 11th the police in Limbe were robbed and 4 rifles were stolen.<sup>103</sup> During the attack on the police barracks<sup>104</sup> one police lieutenant was killed, another policeman seriously wounded and two policemen were missing.<sup>105</sup> The ODA team had recently pulled out of Limbre, and the IPSF there completely fell apart after this incident. The police headquarters building was ransacked, except the portion of the headquarters that was formerly used by the ODA. Rumors circulated that the two missing IPSF soldiers were killed and buried.<sup>106</sup>

These crimes may not be related, but overall they seem to have targeted symbols of the old regime and the IPSF, which in particular is a symbol of international intrusion into Haiti's sovereignty. It appears that these were conducted in such a way as not to provoke SOF since they were conducted in areas where SOF were absent and even went so far as to avoid ransacking areas SOF had occupied. Because of this and the similarities of the crimes it is likely that they were planned by one group, possibly Lavalas, designed to intimidate the IPSF, demonstrate to the populace that the IPSF was impotent, and establish a power base for when U.S. troops left Haiti.

Some of the other developments in Haiti were that a serious land dispute had developed in the Artibonite valley, the most fertile agricultural region of Haiti. There were many disputes, and illegal land claims that led to Haitian-on-Haitian violence. Special forces were to begin Operation RICE BOWL. The object of Operation RICE BOWL was to stop the violence by conducting shows of force, presence patrols, and getting NGO's and the Haitian government to solve the land disputes.<sup>107</sup> By the 25th of January the disputes had not been settled but Special Forces personnel in TF Raleigh were ordered by FRAGO 840 to assess the situation of irrigation canals in the Artibonite valley and provide input for further action on the part of NGO's, PVO's, USAID, and the Haitian government. The special forces were also to look for low cost high impact, high visibility civic action projects.<sup>108</sup>

A CA trip report assessment of the RICE BOWL stated that presence patrols were only a band aid to stopping the violence, and

increased support from PVO's was needed. The report did not specify what support would be needed.<sup>109</sup>

Haitian radio broadcast a statement from Constant calling on his partisans to mobilize for the upcoming legislative, municipal, and local elections. He described the four months following Aristide's return as anarchy, with no signs of security.<sup>110</sup> This statement coincided with the 7 February holiday declared by the Haitian government to celebrate Aristide's rise to power in 1991.<sup>111</sup>

On February 20th MPP, a Lavalas group, denounced the U.S. military because they felt that the military Special Forces in their Plateau Central area had been trying to threaten them. The U.S. troops reported to some MPP members that acts of violence were being planned against them by other MPP members. The MPP denounced this behavior.<sup>112</sup> On the first of March however, a member of MPP was murdered while driving a truck between Delmas and Port au Prince. The driver, Freudner Simon was shot twice.<sup>113</sup> On March 5th the MPP leader, Jean Baptiste stated that they had linked Simon's murder with Neo-Duvalierist forces. The cochairman of MPP, Freda Laurent said that this was an act of intimidation, a common practice of repression, but that MPP would continue their mission onto the Central Plateau.<sup>114</sup>

This murder may be as Jean Baptiste portrayed it, but it may also be that the ODA team was right and this was MPP on MPP violence. No matter who the perpetrator, it would certainly be in the best interests of MPP to portray this as an act of their political opposition.

In late February there was also an unconfirmed report of a gang, called the Red Army, consisting of 40 to 50 individuals operating between Le Borgne and Pilata. They were reported to be under the control of Marc Lamour, a known Lavalas activist, and armed with uzis, .38 revolvers, .45 pistols, M-1 rifles, and mortars. There were no IPSF in the Le Borgne area, only police volunteers.<sup>115</sup> This further suggests that Lavalas was armed and active throughout the country.

In contrast, FRAPH was much more meek. On 3 March, their political posturing consisted of a note issued by the coordination committee of FRAPH. The note stated that Constant was abroad, without verifying that he was in the United States, for the purpose of meeting with important personalities to accelerate the democratic process in Haiti.<sup>116</sup>

Apparently the biggest impact this had was to remind the Government of Haiti that Constant had still escaped justice because on the 15th they asked the United States to extradite Constant and FRAPH's chief deputy, Louis Jodel Chambelain. Constant had entered the U.S. on a visa he obtained in Puerto Rico. He was known to be in the U.S. at that time, but his specific place of residence was not known.<sup>117</sup> The government of Haiti explained that the extradition request for Constant and Chambelain was to serve justice, if vengeance and violence were to stop, impunity to justice must also stop.<sup>118</sup>

Also in March the Lavalas political movement, including OPL, PLB, MOP, the Grand' Anse Resistance Coordination and the Union of Peoples forces of the North, formed a political alliance for the upcoming elections. On the 20th they published their platform for the

elections,<sup>119</sup> and on the 27th they held their first congress.<sup>120</sup> The FNCD was not included in the alliance,<sup>121</sup> and later the FNCD and the 16 December Democratic Camp (K-16) allied to form an their own election front.<sup>122</sup>

Crime in Haiti was still a problem for NGO's as late as 15 March. The CRS sent a memo to the HACC to better coordinate escorts for truck convoys carrying food relief. The last convoy, which was going to Jacmel with relief supplies following the devastation of tropical storm Gordon, only received escort for a portion of the journey, and was pillaged after the escort left. CRS began to prioritize their escort requirements so that the most important supplies could be under continuous escort.<sup>123</sup>

As U.S. troops prepared to transition to U.N. command, there was an unprecedented crime wave in Haiti.<sup>124</sup> On March 28, Lawyer Mirielle Duracher Bertin, who was an ardent Cedras supporter and had just formed the Movement for National Integration was assassinated in her car as was her client, by 4 masked gunmen. The car was caught in a traffic jam in Port au Prince when the murder occurred.<sup>125</sup> This was clearly a political killing.<sup>126</sup> President Aristide denied that any of his supporters were involved in the Bertin assassination.<sup>127</sup>

Prime Minister Smarck Michel announced, on April 3rd, that several persons had been arrested for the Bertin assassination and in their confessions they implicated Interior Minister Beaubrun.<sup>128</sup> Beaubrun was a close personal friend of Aristide, who initially served as Chief of the Haitian Army for Aristide before being appointed by Michel to the post of Interior Minister.<sup>129</sup> U.S. soldiers assisted in

the arrest of the suspected assassins. At least six personnel were arrested. Most of them were associated with United Militants Front (FMR). Among those arrested was Eddy Moise,<sup>130</sup> a former Aristide bodyguard.<sup>131</sup> All but one of the suspected assassins, Claudy Joseph Lacroix, was released on 21 September.<sup>132</sup>

This suggests that the Bertin assassination may have been to preempt any serious political opposition to Lavalas from developing. It was a foreboding that business as usual might continue in Haiti, except that Lavalas would be the oppressors instead.

#### Discussion of Events

Several patterns are evident from the previous events. Table 1 shows that early in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY there was more direct action taken. The events categorized as direct action are beatings, assaults, buses driving into crowds, arrests and fire fights. As events progressed through October, less direct action was taken, confrontations became threats, and as more time passed threats become statements and bargains were made. Threats were statements made that implied action would be taken for certain trigger events, often the threatened action was only implied. Issued statements were political speeches or demonstrations that let the particular players position be known, but implied nothing else. Bargains were deals or agreements made between two parties.

In late September FRAPH was primarily interacting violently with Lavalas factions. This occurred during demonstrations that occurred right after the U.S. forces arrived in Haiti. U.S. forces responded to the violence by threatening action, then arresting FRAPH

members, seizing weapons caches and dealing directly with the FRAPH leader, Emmanuel Constant to get the organizations cooperation. This trend is evident from the data in the row for the first week of Oct 94. The result of these actions by U.S. troops was that FRAPH initially shifted their focus from Lavalas to U.S. troops. But as the U.S. military continued with arrests, FRAPH got weaker. FRAPH then shifted to less violent means of confrontation, threats and statements. Eventually, in December, Emmanuel constant fled the country, FRAPH had become nearly powerless and limited itself to issued statements.

Lavalas, generally left alone by U.S. forces, retained freedom of action. They continued to confront FRAPH with provocative demonstrations and violent action until Emmanuel Constant had fled the country. They avoided any direct confrontation with U.S. forces but acted through third parties, such as crowds, unions, and strikes to make their presence felt. Additionally they acted directly on the populace to posture themselves to win in the eventual elections.

As the U.S. forces ended the cooperation with the Haitian Armed Forces in late September, public cooperation with the U.S. increased. Some of the cooperation was probably due to an interest by various groups, including Lavalas, to disarm FRAPH and the Haitian Armed Forces. The evidence suggesting this is that many arms caches were seized from FRAPH and the Haitian Armed Forces but none were seized belonging to Lavalas, who were also armed.

The NGO groups in Haiti began then to request assistance from the military. Additionally the NGO's and public became confident in the U.S. forces ability to respond to crisis. They called frequently to

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup>William W. Mendell, "The Haiti Contingency," Military Review, January 1994: 50.
- <sup>2</sup>"Pro-Lavalas Parties, Groups Form Election Platform," from Port-au-Prince Signal FM Radio on 15 Mar 1995, Federal Broadcast Information Service-Latin America, 16 Mar 95, 12.
- <sup>3</sup>"Front Addresses Electoral Bill; Dissension Noted," from Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole on 2 Feb 95, FBIS LA, 3 Feb 95, 15.
- <sup>4</sup>"'Neo-Duvalierist Forces' Charged With MPP Murder," from Signal FM Radio on 7 Jan 95, FBIS LA, 8 Mar 95, 6.
- <sup>5</sup>"Eugene Declare Candidacy; Parties Announce Participation," from Radio Metropole on 7 Mar 95, FBIS LA, 8 Mar 95, 6.
- <sup>6</sup>"Pro-Lavalas Parties, Election Platform," FBIS LA, 16 Mar 95, 12.
- <sup>7</sup>"Pro-Lavalas organizations Meet to Preserve Unity," from Signal FM on 15 Mar 95, FBIS LA, 16 Mar 95, 12.
- <sup>8</sup>"Pro-Lavalas Parties Form Common Front for Elections," from Radio Metropole on 20 Mar 95, FBIS LA, 22 Mar 95, 8.
- <sup>9</sup>"Pro-Lavalas Parties, Election Platform," FBIS LA, 16 Mar 95, 12.
- <sup>10</sup>"FNCD Leader: Lavalas Platform Not Answer to Unity," from Radio Metropole on 21 Mar 95, FBIS LA, 22 Mar 95, 8.
- <sup>11</sup>Allan Nairn, "Haiti Under The Gun," The Nation (January 8/15, 1996): 11.
- <sup>12</sup>Allan Nairn, "He's Our SOB," The Nation (October 31, 1994): 481. and Kenneth Freed and Doyle McManus, "Aristide Foe Talks, U.S. Listens," The Los Angeles Times, 8 October 1994: A12.
- <sup>13</sup>Ibid. also "Notebook" The New Republic 4223 (December 25, 1995): 8.
- <sup>14</sup>Ian Martin, "Haiti: Mangled Multilateralism," Foreign Policy 95 (Summer 1994): 73.
- <sup>15</sup>"Aristide Inaugurates Cite Soleil Reconstruction Project," from Signal FM on 31 Jan 95, FBIS LA, 1 Feb 95, 15.
- <sup>16</sup>"EC \$3.6 Million Donation Starts Cite Soleil Rebuilding," from Signal FM on 30 Jan 95, FBIS LA, 2 Feb 95, 11.
- <sup>17</sup>"Reports Confirm Armed Insurgency; Army Deployment Fails to Dislodge Rebel Group," Latin American Weekly Report (28 April 94): 177.

have troops provide security, inducing U.S. troops into the role of policeman.

### Conclusions

The influence of U.S. intervention in Haiti generally produced the desired results of making the environment more secure and stable. The turbulent rioting between pro-Aristide demonstrators and their opposition subsided to acceptable methods of public debate. This suggests that overall the methods employed to achieve these objectives were sound. The next chapter will examine the planning and responses in more depth to determine what actions were most effective in attaining the desired end state and which actions were not effective.

Table 1: TRENDS IN GROUP INTERACTION

Date	Direct Action against			Threats made against			Issued statement	Bargain
	U.S.	FRAPH	Lavalas	U.S.	FRAPH	Lavalas		
Sep 94								
FRAPH			2	1			2	
Lavalas		2					1	
U.S.							2	
NGO								
Oct 94								
week 1								
FRAPH	1			2			2	1
Lavalas		2						1
U.S.		3			3			1
NGO								
week 2								
FRAPH			1	2		2	2	
Lavalas					1			2
U.S.								1
NGO								
week 3								
FRAPH			1			1	3	
Lavalas		2			1		1	1
U.S.								2
NGO								
week 4								
FRAPH						1	1	
Lavalas		1					1	
U.S.						1	8	2
NGO								
Nov 94								
FRAPH								
Lavalas		1						
U.S.								
NGO								
Dec 94								
FRAPH						1	2	
Lavalas								
U.S.								
NGO								
Jan 95								
FRAPH							1	
Lavalas					1		1	1
U.S.							1	
NGO								
Feb 95								
FRAPH							1	
Lavalas					1		2	
U.S.								4
NGO								
Mar 95								
FRAPH			1				5	
Lavalas		1						
U.S.								1
NGO								

18 Joint Task Force 190, "JTF 190: Chronology," Haiti, Caribbean File Room, AHAS, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 14 Sept 94.

19 "JTF 190: Chronology," 18 Sept 94.

20 "Lavalas Rejected Invitation to Meet U.S. Delegation," from Signal FM on 19 Sept 94, FBIS LA, 20 Sept 94, 18-19.

21 "Chronological Events Journal," 19 Sep 94, AHAS, FT. Leavenworth.

22 "Lavalas Demonstrates In Support of Aristide Return," from Mexico City NOTIMEX on 19 Sept 94, FBIS LA, 20 Sept 94, 19.

23 "Police Beat Pro-Aristide Demonstrators 19 Sep," from Radio Metropole on 19 Sept 94, FBIS LA, 20 Sept 94, 19.

24 "JTF 190: Chronology," 20 Sept 94.

25 "Shelton Threatens Use of Troops Against Police," from Radio Metropole on 21 Sept 94, FBIS LA, 22 Sept 94, 18.

26 Herold Jean Francois, "Army Spokesman Denies Artillery Corps Dismantled," from Madrid EFE on 22 Sept 94, FBIS LA, 23 Sept 94, 15.

27 Herold Jean-Francois, "Army Spokesman Denies Artillery Corps Dismantled," from Madrid EFE on 22 Sept 94, FBIS LA, 23 Sept 94, 15.

28 Herold Jean-Francois, "Army Spokesman Denies Artillery Corps Dismantled," from Madrid EFE on 22 Sept 94, FBIS LA, 23 Sept 94, 15.

29 "Armed Clash Marks End of 'Co-operation' between US and Haitian Military," Latin American Weekly Report (6 October 1994), 445.

30 "JTF 190: Chronology," 25 Sept 94.

31 "FRAPH Attacks Demonstrators; 29 Sep Protest Noted," from Madrid EFE on 28 Sept 94, FBIS LA, 29 Sept 94, 9.

32 Herold Jean-Francois, "FRAPH Attacks Demonstrators; 29 Sep Protest Noted," from Madrid EFE on 28 Sept 94, FBIS LA, 29 Sept 94, 9.

33 "Pro-Aristide Demonstrators Clash With FRAPH," from Madrid EFE on 30 Sept 94, FBIS LA, 3 Oct 94, 16.

34 "30 Sep Casualties Reported," from Signal FM on 30 Sept 94, FBIS LA, 3 Oct 94, 16.

35 Radio Message, CJTF 180 to CINCUSACOM, 301200Z SEP 94, AHAS, FT. Leavenworth.

36 "U.S. Troops Take Hands on Tack in Haiti's North," The Los Angeles Times, 9 October 1994: A1.

37 "JTF 190: Chronology," 2 Oct 94.

38 "The Caribbean Campaign: Operation Sea Signal Support/Uphold Democracy/Maintain Democracy, Working Chronology V," 2 Oct 94, Caribbean Room, AHAS, FT. Leavenworth.

39 "Aristide Supporters Set Fire to FRAPH Office," from Radio Metropole on 4 Oct 94, FBIS LA, 5 Oct 94, 8.

40 "Aristide Supporter Set Fire to FRAPH Office," from Radio Metropole on 4 Oct 94, FBIS LA, 5 Oct 94, 8.

41 Nairn, "He's Our SOB", 481.

42 "Chronological Events Journal" 3 Oct 94, Haiti, Caribbean File Room, AHAS, FT. Leavenworth.

43 FRAPH Members Arrested; Constant Reacts," from Port-au-Prince Tropic FM on 3 Oct 94, FBIS LA, 4 Oct 94, 14.

44 "JTF 190: Chronology," 3 Oct 94.

45 Ibid.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

### ANALYSIS OF THE EVENTS IN OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

The essence of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was to remove LTG Raoul Cedras from power and create a stable and secure environment for the return of President Aristide. Cedras agreed to give up power and allow U.S. forces to land unopposed, thus avoiding many combat casualties. This marked a deviation from the plan and events moved rapidly from that point. The initial plan called for SOF to be inserted into the outlying towns within 48 hours of the invasion to fill the power vacuum expected to be created by the defeat of the Haitian Armed Forces.<sup>1</sup> One planner judged that, "teams of infantry, MP's, civil affairs and psychological operations were key to winning the morning after."<sup>2</sup> There was more concern for anarchy and instability in the outlying areas than there was for real combat.<sup>3</sup> This suggests that planners for the operation had expected and taken into account the occurrence of many of the events that unfolded during the real operation. Did the forces in Haiti effectively execute the plans to achieve the desired effects? The information presented in Chapter Three suggests that overall the execution of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was effective. Further analysis of the doctrine employed and the results documented in the narrative will provide useful insights into particular strengths and weaknesses of current doctrine and SOF training.

### Legitimacy

A mandate from the United Nations provided a measure of legitimacy for the operation that established the support and permission of the international community to act, but was not wholly convincing to Haiti's population. When U.S. forces were patrolling the streets with the Haitian police and armed forces, the people may have associated this with an attempt to legitimize the Cedras regime. As discussed in Chapter Two of this study, doctrine stresses care in dealing with particular individuals or organizations where a clearly legitimate government does not exist, to avoid legitimizing them. Several factors suggest that in Haiti the agreement with Cedras to allow U.S. forces to land unopposed did not legitimize the Cedras government but hurt U.S. legitimacy with the Haitian populace. These include the report that Biamby, and Francois wanted to kill Cedras, and the refusal of Lavalas to meet with the U.S. delegation. These were two groups of Haitian people, who were antagonistic to each other. Neither group supported the U.S. presence. Another factor is the demonstrations that took place in support of Aristide, taking advantage of the presence of journalists and U.S. troops, to confront the Cedras regime. The demonstrators were not out in support of the U.S. presence, but for their deposed president.

Special operations personnel had no control over the agreement reached by former President Carter with LTG Raoul Cedras, but could have minimized subsequent association with Haitian Armed Forces personnel. Clearly the public became more supportive of the U.S. only after the firefight between the U.S. Marines and the Haitian Armed Forces on 24

September made it apparent that the U.S. was not backing the Cedras regime.

The invasion plan suggests that the Special Forces personnel were prepared to assume the role of maintaining order. They chose to do this by patrolling with Haitian's, trying to improve the professionalism of the Haitian Armed Forces. By associating with the Haitian Armed Forces the cooperation of various other groups was possibly hindered due to a perceived backing of the Cedras regime. Lavalas remained aloof of the U.S. throughout the operation, possibly because of the association with Cedras and the Haitian Armed Forces. This is significant since Lavalas was the primary benefactor of an Aristide return to power. Alternatively SOF could have patrolled independently and maintained their order on their own. This may have mitigated any impressions that the U.S. was there to provide backing for the status quo.

When the U.S. later began to arrest members of FRAPH and the Haitian Armed Forces, legitimacy with these groups was lost. There is no evidence to support a corresponding gain in legitimacy with Lavalas or other major segments of the populace. Subsequent incidents such as the shooting of SSG Holstead in Les Cayes, and robbery of the police stations at Grand Goave, Jeremie, and Limbe are indicative of this loss of legitimacy of the U.S. Forces and their surrogates.

#### Impartiality, Legitimacy, and Security

U.S. doctrine for OOTW establishes that security of the force is often fostered by legitimacy, impartiality, demonstration of strong military capability, and preparedness. In Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, impartiality could not be realistically maintained. In order to stop

the use of excessive force, the troops would have to take action against the Haitian Armed Forces. This was threatened by LTG Shelton and subsequently the U.S. initiated a series of raids and arrests on FRAPH and the Haitian Armed Forces. These actions clearly singled out pro-regime factions and these factions responded with threats and attacks on U.S. special forces. Legitimacy with the populace was at best nebulous, and subsequent to the raids and arrests, FRAPH and the Haitian Armed Forces were not supportive of the U.S.

The fact that U.S. special forces suffered very few casualties is a triumph in security for the forces. This triumph was not based on the perception of legitimacy and impartiality, however, since these were clearly not present. Protection of the force was likely the result of the perception that overwhelming combat power could and would be applied. The military capability of the special forces was tested by FRAPH when they attacked SSG Holstead. FRAPH only wounded SSG Holstead, while he killed two of his assailants. This was followed by the transport of a Ranger company to Les Cayes, in the same day, as a show of force. Special forces were able to repel an attack in Delmas 3 without casualties and apprehended some of the attackers. This evidence suggests that the credible demonstration of strong military capability and responsiveness were the dominant factors in protecting the force in Haiti.

It appears that this same credibility did not extend to the new police in Haiti as they became targets of assault, murder, and robbery after special forces ODA teams left their area. The police, who were trained by International Police Monitors (IPM) were attacked at Grand

Goave, Jeremie, and Limbe. Since the new police were attacked after U.S. troops left, it is clear that they enjoyed protection from the U.S. presence, but had little credibility on their own. This is further evidence that it was military capability, not legitimacy, that protected the force.

Security for the populace and NGO/PVO's was apparently also facilitated by strong military capability and responsiveness. In early October special operations forces began providing security on a case-by-case basis for various Humanitarian Relief Organizations. In January ARSOTF confronted OPL over the Miragoane port closure, where they were clearly the lead law enforcement element even though the Interim Provisional Security Force was included. Also a member of the Chamber of Deputies asked for special forces protection in January since Haitian police in Jeremie refused to protect him from local leftists. As late as March special forces were still responding to 911 calls, and had agreed to provide escorts to Christian Relief Services convoys delivering aid to Jacmel.

This suggests that special forces were perceived to be the security in Haiti, and in fact were the primary providers of security in Haiti, and that there was still little confidence in the Haitian police to provide protection as the U.S. led Multi-National Force prepared to transition to the United Nations Mission in Haiti.

#### Unity of Effort

Special Operations personnel worked closely with many agencies to promote stability and security in Haiti, and while overall the

operations produced the desired effect there is evidence that many endeavors could have been orchestrated better.

The support of FRAPH by the CIA and the direction to SOF personnel to treat FRAPH as the legal opposition following Emmanuel Constant's promised support to the U.S., suggest that there was U.S. government interest in maintaining FRAPH as a legitimate opposing view point to President Aristide. This interest likely began prior to LTG Shelton's talk with Constant and the raids on FRAPH headquarters. Support of FRAPH after the raids would tend to undermine the mission's legitimacy, and not promote a climate of trust and transparency. FRAPH had lost much of its clout and eventually failed when Constant fled the country to escape Haitian justice. It is clear that the U.S. military effort to dismantle the FRAPH and keep paramilitaries on the run was at odds with efforts to enhance FRAPH as a legitimate political opposition to the Lavalas popular movement.

Additionally the plan to invade Haiti to depose the Cedras government included provisions for SOF to fill the power void left by the Haitian Armed Forces so that order could be maintained in the country side. In view of this, the effort by MP's and IPM's to hold the Haitian police together was counterproductive, since the original plan called for removal of the Haitian Armed Forces. It appears that an early breakup of the Haitian Armed Forces and police was desirable. Why was any effort expended to maintain them? SOF also supported this effort when they monitored the armed forces arrest some Lavalas partisans, who were throwing rocks at FRAPH families. Later SOF witnessed other Lavalas partisans throwing rocks again, and instead of

arresting them, they led the FRAPH families away. This response seemed inconsistent with the objective of maintaining security, it was clear from previous actions that FRAPH personnel committing these crimes would have been arrested by SOF.

When two soldiers from the Haitian Armed Forces were murdered while trying to serve a warrant, after action reports seemed to imply that the underlying problem was that the Haitian soldiers did not request assistance from SOF prior to serving the warrant. There was no subsequent show of force to protect Haitian soldiers as there was following the attack on SSG Holstead. Lavalas was allowed to burn FRAPH buildings, homes of FRAPH members, and intimidate pro-Cedras parliament members with apparent impunity.

These events suggest that there was no consistent effort to either maintain a secure environment for all Haitian citizens, nor a wholly consistent effort to either remove the Haitian Armed forces or support them.

To build a stable environment, civil affairs units conducted assessments early in the operation to develop a plan for nation building. They requested help through interagency processes since most of the functions required were beyond their capability. Civil affairs funds ran out at one point so that CA personnel could perform only limited services. Political dominance supposes that the assessments were made to define military projects in support of the political objectives. The shortage of funding suggests that the number or scope of the projects that CA proposed were beyond what was financially sustainable, or that the CA programs suffered from neglect. In either

case this shows that CA programs were a lower priority than other aspects of the operation. Since CA project generally enhance long term stability, it appears that long term stability suffered for short term tactical success in achieving security.

There is ample evidence that the CMOC and HACC were effective in attracting participation from many NGO/PVO and they requested many services from the Military. According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, these requests often outstripped actual military capabilities. Additionally to divert assets from military functions would often disrupt the military operation.<sup>4</sup>

It appears that there was a gap between capabilities and reality in the military's expectations from NGO/PVO and likewise from the NGO/PVO to the military. If an NGO/PVO could perform its mission without military assistance one might assume that it would do so. This would simplify the coordination. There are two tangible reasons for them to seek military assistance: one is to save money and resources for other purposes, and the second is that they required it to accomplish their ends. Haiti is underdeveloped compared to most western nations, and it may be that NGO/PVO could not contract out for the services required. Regardless of the reasons, the CMOC could not always provide the service requested. Most often the services were provided as available, and a remarkable amount of cooperation and coordination was achieved.

An excellent example of this coordination is the food distribution program. Three different organizations and the military each complemented the other to distribute food to feeding areas,

avoiding duplication of effort. The CA personnel did not take over distribution as the NGO's feared, but did encourage them to coordinate their efforts and the military committed to providing security. This could be a useful model for facilitating similar cooperation on a larger scale.

The case study suggests that one impediment to cooperation between NGO's and the military is ignorance of what each is capable of doing, and what each is interested in doing. The current process allows an NGO to put in a request for service, and if the military can do it without detracting from other missions, the military provides the service. This has the unfortunate side effect of making the efforts of the NGO's a lower priority than the military objective. The principle of unity of effort expects the military to commit resources to achieve the political objective. If the NGO is in a better position to achieve the political objective than the military, this should get a higher priority of military support. The CMOC and HACC could disseminate the findings of the CA assessments to the NGO/PVO's and solicit remarks, this in turn could be used to formulate a nation building plan that included more participants. Transparency and clarity of purpose could then be used as building blocks for mutual respect and trust. The military should be willing to support NGO's priority projects on a more or less contractual basis and in turn can ask for NGO support of projects that are a priority for the military operation. Without the authority or willingness to commit resources to organizations and projects that are beyond the military objective, cooperation will only occur at the lowest common level. Achieving unity of effort for the overall political

objective may take more than coordinating only those aspects that each organization has in common. Political dominance as a principle should allow commanders to incorporate such measures into plans for OOTW.

#### A Clear Objective

One of the greatest obstacles to attainment of unity of effort and a plan that will use resources effectively and efficiently, is a clear objective. Returning President Aristide to power sounds clear enough, but several events suggest that this may only have been a portion of the overall political objective.

SOF received some late direction to treat FRAPH as the loyal opposition, which does not appear to have facilitated the return of President Aristide to power. The interest in having a political party that would balance the extreme left of Lavalas suggests that Aristide's return to power was only an intermediate step to another objective, which was a more moderate democratic government in Haiti. It appears that this ultimate objective was never articulated to the SOF personnel, since they expended effort to disarm, and arrest many FRAPH personnel. Eventually FRAPH was rendered impotent when Emmanuel Constant fled the country. Ultimately the goal of maintaining FRAPH to moderate the Lavalas influence failed.

There were several instances where Lavalas members committed arson, assault, and possibly even murder, but there was no action taken to break up this group like there was for FRAPH and the Haitian Armed Forces. This appears to be counter to the implied objective of a more moderate government.

Whether there was an unstated objective or not is debatable, but some of the direction given to SOF make it clear that the objectives, stated or unstated were not clear to those expected to effect change.

### Transparency

Transparency is often desired to enhance the view of impartiality, and legitimacy. It is also useful to foster trust and unity of effort. Many parties in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY had agendas that were not fully disclosed. As previously discussed, the U.S. may have had objectives different than returning President Aristide to power and building a secure and stable environment. While this is not certain, Emmanuel Constant gave a speech, written by the embassy spokesman. During the speech, he was surrounded by U.S. troops. He said that there was no deal with the U.S., but this picture was hardly plausible to the Haitians hearing the speech. Even if there were no bargain struck this display makes an unconvincing presentation.

This display, however did not seem to cause undue danger to the SOF personnel in outlying areas. SSG Holstead was attacked the day before the Constant speech; after the speech FRAPH personnel continued to threaten violence against the U.S. but the force did not experience a wave of violence. The speech may have had some effect in the security of the force, but it certainly did nothing to enhance U.S. legitimacy with the populace and NGO's.

### Restraint and ROE

This case study did not compile sufficient evidence to conduct an analysis of these areas, and so can not make significant comment. The lack of evidence may be indicative of the effectiveness of the restraint and the final ROE used in the operation.

### Perseverance

The efforts to build a stable environment in Haiti are ongoing, and indicative of the interest the international community has in its success. Perseverance is of little value without the corresponding commitment of resources to accomplish the objectives. It is impossible to make significant comments on perseverance since a conclusion can not be drawn until the events come to a close. The evidence suggests that there was enough commitment to achieve a return to power of President Aristide, reduce the violence and proceed with elections. Since this was a desired outcome of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the operation must overall be judged successful at this point.

### Adaptability

There are numerous examples of the ability of SOF to adapt to the political environment, the objective, and various assigned missions. The study found no examples of a failure to adapt. The ability of SOF to conduct shows of force, respond to a strike that closed the port at Miragoane, integrate PSYOP into presence patrols, conduct crowd control, and educate Haitians about democracy are certainly adequate examples of the success of SOF to adapt their techniques to the changing

requirements of the mission. SOF used the principle of adaptability and it did significantly contribute to the success of the mission.

#### Planning for OOTW

Doctrine for OOTW acknowledges that plans will develop incrementally as the reality of the environment becomes apparent. According to current doctrine, initial plans map out a direction and a desired political, and economic end state. Even if the objective and the mandate for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY were not clear, planners could use their own estimates of what those were to develop plans. These plans are then supplemented with assessments and refined to deal with the situation as it is perceived. Only when perceptions differ significantly from reality, will plans be inadequate for the task.

Haiti had endured a lengthy embargo prior to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, which had serious impact on the economy and infrastructure. This was a predictable result of the embargo. CA assessments in many of the outlying areas indicated the work that needed to be done was beyond the capacity of the CA teams and forces in Haiti. Also many of the humanitarian efforts were hindered by the lack of infrastructure, poor roads, lack of fuel and tires, and the need for other parts to get equipment operating. Again this was a predictable outcome of the embargo. Planners might adjust their plans appropriately to compensate for an expected shortage of these items in the area of operation, thus speeding the process of recovery.

Some of the assessments stated that once the embargo was lifted the shortages would be filled through the normal economic processes and thus the problems were only temporary inconveniences that would be self

correcting. This is perhaps an unrealistic view of the ability of an economy to recover itself. First, to purchase replacement parts and fuel, capital is required. The owners and government agencies had been forced by the embargo to use up their capital to survive. They might require outside assistance to start up again. Additionally if the industry required skilled labor, that labor must be brought back to the job somehow, or new labor trained. Neither of these happen without additional expenditure of resources and effort. It appears that there is little experience in this sort of nation building effort, and planners expectations of the difficulty and resources required were significantly underestimated.

It is probably equally unrealistic to expect planners to be accurate in their estimates prior to conducting actual on site analysis and assessments. It appears from the evidence that this was appreciated by CA teams and planners since personnel were sent out to conduct estimates very early in the operation.

Planners must include termination procedures in the plans. These procedures must also be made available to any other agencies that the CA or other SOF personnel are cooperating with. They should know how much military support they will receive, and when to expect it to be replaced by alternate sources of support. This case study suggests that this could have been done better in several circumstances, including responding to requests to provide security for convoys and food distribution centers, and 911 calls. It appears that after 7 months the population and NGO's had become more dependent on SOF rather than less dependent.

### Conclusion

The analysis of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY shows that there was successful accomplishment of the mission. This chapter discussed the use of current doctrine, how it affected interactions with various nonstate actors, and the contributions of SOF actions to mission accomplishment.

Often events perpetrated by a third party caused an interaction between SOF and various nonstate actors. This demonstrated that SOF must be aware of the entire scope of the operation and anticipate how each participant may respond so that they can protect themselves, and continue to operate effectively to achieve the political and military objectives.

Problems were discussed in several areas that detracted from achieving the objectives of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. In each of case, doctrine was not followed to various extents. Political objectives changed and were not well understood by SOF personnel, hindering the achievement of unity of effort, and political dominance. The Haitians were not convinced of U.S. legitimacy because of an association with the Haitian Armed Forces, the FRAPH, and evidence of hidden motives. Security for the force was achieved even without legitimacy. This suggests that the credibility of strong military capability and responsiveness were sufficient to protect the force, while the problems encountered by Haitian police forces show that legitimacy is not sufficient to provide security without credibility.

The use of the CMOC and the HACC achieved a remarkable amount of cooperation with NGO/PVO's and the military. However the U.S.

military was unwilling or unable to provide sufficient support to them to complete many of the projects called for in the Civil Affairs assessments. NGO/PVO's could be used better by including them in the process that determines the desired social and economic end state and working with them collectively, not individually, on a contractual basis. This would guarantee them a consistent level of military support and provide a clear termination for the military involvement. Once the obligation of the contract had been met new agreements could be made as needed.

Endnotes

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## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study demonstrated that current doctrine written for use by SOF and other forces in OOTW is generally valid and useful for planning and conducting operations. In many cases nonstate actors clearly reacted to specific events perpetrated by another force. Their actions were isolable from other aspects of the operation such that a cause and effect relationship was implied or specifically stated in a reporting of various types or a violent reaction. Several of these events taken together suggested trends that are lessons from this case study.

When doctrine was followed nonstate actors reacted in rational and predictable ways. This allowed SOF to achieve desired results. Conversely, when doctrine was not, or could not be, followed desired objectives were not always attained.

#### Doctrine Used in OOTW

##### Clearly Defined Objective

Failure to receive, or formulate a clear political objective can be manifested in several ways. It is difficult to achieve unity of effort if SOF do not know or understand the real political desires. This misunderstanding results in misapplication of resources. The natural consequence of misapplication of resources is that effort is

wasted, thus squandering limited resources without effect. An even worse consequence is that resources are expended that produce effects that are contrary to the desired end.

Unstated or redefined objectives confuse observers and diminish the perception of legitimacy, transparency, and impartiality. This can undermine support for the operation by the populace.

Objective can be considered a higher priority principle than unity of effort, political dominance, and security, since all of these can only be completely achieved after a clear objective is defined. When objective changes or grows, SOF and other participants in the operation must know about it completely and quickly to adjust resources and plans to support.

#### Improved Cooperation With NGO/PVO

A clearly defined social and economic end state that is designed in conjunction with NGO's and PVO's could be used to build unity of effort. A contractual agreement made by the CMOC, or HACC, for the military with participating NGO/PVO would allow consistency in mutual support, and define a clear termination point for the military. More cooperation could be achieved and more resources could be uniformly applied on agreed priorities to achieve the desired ends. The current method promotes relationships of convenience, and settles for the lowest common goal. This is done by allocating military resources as requested by others, and providing what is available, as long as it does not interfere with the military objective. This procedure places the priority on the military objective, which may not be the most important to achievement of the desired political, social and economic end state.

## Security and Force Protection

Current doctrine states that legitimacy, impartiality, consent of parties, and prudent use of strong military capability and ROE are all important in providing security and protection for the force. This study showed that prudent use of military capability establishes credibility, and that this was the most significant factor contributing to force protection. It is unlikely that a force will be able to establish universal legitimacy with all participants in a conflict. Impartiality may not be possible either, depending on the nature of the operation. Legitimacy and impartiality can enhance protection, but without credible and prudent use of force, they are only words.

## Legitimacy

Doctrine states that commanders must exercise caution when dealing with parties where no clearly legitimate government exists, to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. This study showed that by associating or working with a party that had questionable claims to legitimacy, their legitimacy was not enhanced, but rather the legitimacy of U.S. forces was degraded or lost.

## Transition and Termination of the Military Role

Ultimately the military commander and SOF must enhance the ability of civilians to perform the functions required to maintain a stable and secure environment. There is danger in allowing or fostering a dependency on SOF or other military personnel to provide services that should be provided by private enterprise of local government. The

principal failure in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was the tendency to rely on special forces personnel in outlying areas to respond to emergency calls as the local police.

Plans and resources must be dedicated to establishing a credible replacement for whatever functions were performed by the military during an operation.

#### Significance of the Study

This study is significant because it increases the experience based knowledge that gives military personnel confidence in their methods and doctrine used to plan and conduct OOTW.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY validated the methods used to establish a secure environment. This study provides insight on the strengths of current doctrine and some weaknesses as they were applied in Haiti.

The events and circumstances in Haiti have their unique dimensions as all such operations do, but Haiti is similar to many others also. Conflict and violence have long been human reactions to unmet expectations. The lessons from Haiti presented in this study can, and should be used to guide future operations in Low Intensity Conflict and OOTW.

#### Recommendations for Further Study

While the findings of this study are supported by the events in Haiti, this is only one study. The narrative in Chapter Three falls far short of achieving a complete accounting of the interactions between SOF and other NSAs. The reports that come from radio broadcast, newspapers,

memoranda, and even military operating logs do not give a complete picture of the events they attempt to capture, and in combination they do not provide a complete description of the events in Haiti. The narrative of Chapter Three is focused on the events recorded by and about SOF and various NSAs in Haiti. There are many other participants in the events of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY that had effects on SOF and NSAs that were deliberately not included. Certainly there are also omissions of information that may be relevant to the research.

Further research could profitably be done to further substantiate or refute conclusions presented in this thesis. This could be done in the context of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY using the entire scope of the operation to research the effects of perceived legitimacy on protection of the force. This could also be examined in the context of many other OOTW situations.

The findings of this thesis on the effect of dealing with a party of questionable legitimacy, disagree with the current doctrine contained in U.S. Army FM 100-23 Peace Operations. This is also recommended for further study.

Ultimately experience will continue to be the best training field for soldiers in OOTW. The next operation will be different than the last, and each must be considered in accord with its own particular characteristics. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY succeeded in returning President Aristide to power and paved the way for democratic elections. We must note its many successes as well as its shortcomings.

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